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Abstract 
 
We use probabilistic expectations data elicited from survey respondents in rural Malawi to 
investigate how risky sexual behavior may be influenced by individuals’ expectations about 
survival and future HIV status, which in turn depend on the perceived impact of HIV/AIDS on 
survival, expectations about own and partner’s current HIV status, and expectations about HIV 
transmission rates. Subjective expectations, in particular about mortality risk but not the risk of 
living with HIV, play an important role in determining the decision to have multiple sexual 
partners. Using our estimated parameters, we simulate the impact of various policies that would 
influence expectations. An information campaign on mortality risk would decrease risky sexual 
behavior on average, while an information campaign on HIV transmission risks, which tend to be 
overestimated by respondents, would actually increase risky behavior. Also, the expansion of 
anti-retroviral therapy (ART) treatments to all individuals infected with HIV would increase 
risky sexual behavior for a quarter of the HIV-negative individuals or those who have not been 
tested because they are aware that ART increases life expectancy, and thus reduces the cost of 
becoming HIV-positive. 
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1. Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the region of the world most affected by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. It accounts for over two thirds of all people infected worldwide, with adult prevalence 
rates reaching above 25% in some countries (UNAIDS, 2012). Heterosexual intercourse is the 
most common pathway of infection in the region. While there is a growing emphasis on 
biomedical interventions to prevent HIV infections or improve the health of HIV-positive 
individuals, interventions targeted at behavioral change remain an essential part of the 
HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, especially in poor countries (UNAIDS, 2012). To effectively 
change risky sexual behavior, it is important to understand why individuals who live in high-
HIV-prevalence environments engage in those behaviors. There are several non-mutually 
exclusive explanations that can be put forward. One explanation may be related to differential 
preferences (e.g., individuals in SSA may have higher utility from having multiple sexual 
partners). Another reason may be the high burden of disease and the resulting high levels of non-
HIV-related mortality, lowering the return of safe sex strategies. For example, Oster (2012) and 
Philipson and Posner (1993) argue that individuals have little motivation to adopt risk-prevention 
strategies, as these strategies provide only limited gains in terms of longer life expectancy, while 
they are “costly” in monetary terms (e.g., purchasing condoms) or foregone pleasures (e.g., 
lower levels of satisfaction as a result of giving up extramarital partners). Another reason may be 
that individuals have misperceptions about their current HIV status, transmission rates or the 
HIV prevalence in their community. With data on behavior only, it is not possible to distinguish 
explanations based on preferences from those based on beliefs, thereby limiting the ability to 
devise effective behavioral interventions. 
In this paper, we use very rich data on probabilistic beliefs that we collected directly from 
rural Malawi survey respondents to investigate the role of HIV/AIDS-related expectations on the 
decision to engage in risky sex (in this case, having multiple sexual partners), and simulate the 
impact of various policies on risky behavior. We develop a simple, though quite general, two-
period theoretical framework which highlights the role of expectations in the decision to engage 
in risky sexual behavior. Our framework shows that the subjective survival probabilities 
associated with having risky sex and with having safe sex are crucial for decision-making. It also 
shows that these probabilities depend in turn on a set of six subjective expectations: (i) 
expectations of survival conditional on being healthy, (ii) expectations of survival conditional on 
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being infected, (iii) expectations about own current HIV status, (iv) expectations about partners’ 
current HIV status, (v) expectations about HIV transmission rate associated with safe sex and 
(vi) that associated with risky sex. A unique feature of this paper is that we have data on all those 
expectations that are potentially relevant for behavior. We combine those expectations data with 
data on sexual behavior to estimate our model. We find that the difference in subjective survival 
probability associated with having multiple sexual partners versus having one partner plays an 
important role in determining the decision to have multiple sexual partners. We also find that the 
estimate for the disutility parameter associated with being infected with HIV (compared to being 
healthy) is not statistically significantly different from zero. This suggests that (i) individuals in 
rural Malawi are forward-looking and take into account mortality risk when making health-
related choices, (ii) the threat of reduced survival associated with HIV, rather than the threat of 
living with HIV, influences sexual behavior in the SSA context, (iii) expectations data are useful 
in understanding risk-taking behavior in the context of developing countries, and (iv) changing 
individual beliefs may be one way to change risky sexual behavior in high-HIV-prevalence 
environments.  
Using our estimated preference parameters, we simulate the impact of various policies 
that would influence individual expectations. We find that an information campaign on HIV 
transmission risks, leading people to revise their subjective beliefs to statistics from medical 
studies, would have a counter-productive effect and increase the average probability of having 
multiple partners from 21.9% to 26.9% for men and from 2.6% to 3.8% for women. This is 
because respondents widely overestimate the relative impact of having multiple partners on the 
average probability of becoming infected with HIV compared to having one partner. However, 
providing information on the mortality risk of someone healthy and of someone infected with 
HIV, leading people to revise their beliefs to available statistics from life tables, would have a 
positive impact and decrease the average probability of having multiple partners to 15.6% for 
men and 2.3% for women. This is because individuals under-estimate the magnitude of the 
negative impact of HIV/AIDS on survival. To our knowledge, providing information on 
mortality risk has never been implemented and may be a new avenue for campaign. Also, we 
investigate the impact of the expansion of anti-retroviral therapy treatments (ART) to all 
individuals infected with HIV. While this is a medical intervention targeted to infected people, it 
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may have repercussion on everyone’s sexual behavior.1 In particular, it could change beliefs 
about mortality risk if infected. We find that such an expansion would increase the probability of 
having multiple sexual partners for about a quarter of the HIV-negative individuals or those who 
have not been tested. Because those individuals are aware that ART increases life expectancy, 
universal treatment reduces the perceived cost of becoming HIV-positive. Note that because we 
do not know how respondents would revise their beliefs in light of new information or new 
treatment options, these results can be seen as an upper bound of the anticipated behavioral 
change.  
While survey respondents in developed countries have increasingly been asked about 
subjective expectations in the last 20 years, only recently has this occurred in developing 
countries. Delavande et al. (2011) and Delavande (2014) review the existing evidence and 
conclude that collecting expectations data in developing countries is both feasible and valuable.
2
 
In this paper, we use data on probabilistic expectations about a wide range of events that we have 
collected as part of the 2006 wave of the Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health 
(MLSFH, Kohler et al, 2014) covering more than 3,000 adult respondents in rural Malawi.
3
 In 
Delavande and Kohler (2009), we find that respondents from Malawi provide meaningful 
expectations in probabilistic format according to various criteria: most respondents provide 
probabilities that are consistent with basic properties of probability theory, the subjective 
expectations are systematically correlated with observable characteristics (such as gender, age, 
education, and region of residence) in the same way that actual outcomes vary with these 
variables, and expectations about future events vary across individuals in the same way as 
individuals’ past experience does. Yet, respondents exhibit a lot of heterogeneity in expectations. 
The advantage of using expectations data in empirical work is that it mitigates a basic 
identification problem that researchers face when using data on choices only: observed choices 
may be consistent with many combinations of expectations and preferences. Although data on 
expectations are becoming available, only a limited number of studies have until now employed 
them to draw inferences on behavior. Recent studies incorporating expectations into econometric 
                                                 
1
 Among HIV-positive individuals, Lakdawalla et al. (2006) find that the introduction of ART increases sexual 
activity in the U.S. while Thirumurthy et al. (2012) find that enrollment in AIDS treatment programs increases the 
frequency of sex but also condom use in Kenya. 
2
 See Manski (2004) and Hurd (2009) for a review of the literature on expectations in developed countries. 
3
 The MLSFH has previously also been known as the Malawi Diffusion and Ideational Change Project (MDICP). 
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models have addressed various decisions, such as contraception choice (Delavande, 2008a), 
portfolio allocation (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2011, Kezdi and Willis, 2011), fertility and 
sexual behavior (Shapira, 2010, de Paula et al., 2014), education (Zafar, 2013, Arcidiacono et al., 
2012), teacher career (van der Klaauw, 2012), committing a crime (Lochner, 2007), migration 
(McKenzie et al., 2013), strategies in games (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002, Bellemare et al., 2008), 
and the timing of Social Security claiming and retirement (van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008, 
Hurd et al., 2004). We contribute to this line of work that combines choice data with data on 
subjective expectations to draw inferences on preferences. We do this in the context of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in SSA. 
Due to potential endogeneity issues, it is challenging in many empirical applications to 
evaluate how expectations of events over which individuals have some control causally affect 
their decisions: Unobservable characteristics may influence both the formation of expectations 
and decision-making. Few papers using expectations data have addressed the endogeneity issue 
directly (see discussion in van der Klaauw, 2012).
4
 We deal with the potential endogeneity 
arising from the dependence of expectations on past behavior by estimating a system of 
equations: beliefs about current HIV status depend on past sexual behavior and observable 
characteristics; the decision to get tested for HIV is explicitly estimated; and the decision to 
engage in risky sexual behavior depends on individual HIV/AIDS-related expectations.  
Our paper builds on several studies that have analyzed the impact of the belief about one 
single HIV/AIDS-related event on sexual behavior in SSA. De Paula et al. (2014), for example, 
use data from the MLSFH to evaluate the impact of beliefs about one’s own HIV status on the 
likelihood of engaging in risky behavior. They find that downward revisions in beliefs of being 
HIV-positive increase risky behavior. Unlike them, Gong (2015) finds that, in the Tanzanian and 
Kenyan context, individuals who believed themselves to be at low risk of infection have an 
increased likelihood of contracting a sexually transmitted disease (STD), indicating riskier sexual 
behavior, after a positive HIV test, while the reverse is true for those who are surprised by a 
                                                 
4
 De Paula et al. (2014) use a panel data estimator which accommodates unobserved heterogeneity as well as belief 
endogeneity arising from the dependence of current beliefs on lagged behaviors, Lochner (2007) uses fixed-effect 
instrumental-variable estimates, and Bellemare et al. (2008) model preferences and beliefs jointly to address the 
endogeneity issue. 
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negative HIV test.
5
 Without using changes in beliefs about one’s own HIV status directly, 
several papers have also looked at the causal impact of learning one’s HIV status on subsequent 
sexual behavior (e.g., Thornton, 2008; Delavande and Kohler, 2012).  
Few papers have assessed the role of beliefs about transmission risks on sexual behavior 
(Meekers and Klein, 2002; Lammers et al., 2013). Sterck (2013) documents a large over-
estimation of HIV transmission risks among students in Burundi and develops a behavioral 
model yielding a U-shaped relationship between risky behavior and expected transmission risk.  
We are not aware of any study looking directly at the impact of beliefs about mortality risk on 
sexual behavior. Indirectly but related to this, Oster (2012) finds that a high rate of non-HIV 
mortality decreases the change in sexual behavior due to an increase in HIV prevalence in SSA.  
We argue that beliefs about all those events are likely to be crucial to the decision to 
engage in risky sex and therefore ought to be considered jointly in empirical work. We therefore 
complement and improve on the current literature by evaluating the impact of sexual behavior on 
beliefs about own and partner’s HIV status, transmission risks (conditional on having a safe and 
a risky behavior) and mortality risk (conditional on being infected and on being healthy). This 
allows us to evaluate how a wide range of policies such as information campaigns on mortality 
risks and on transmission risks, and the roll-out of ART affect risky sexual behavior. 
Understanding the potential magnitude of the behavioral response to change in expectations is 
particularly relevant in the current context in which AIDS-related mortality and HIV 
transmission risks are rapidly changing, mostly as a result of ART (Bor et al., 2013, Cohen, 
2011).
6
 It is important to determine potential trends in behavior if individuals start to internalize 
those reduced probabilities. Note, however, that our analysis is restricted to how changes in 
beliefs change risky sexual behavior, but we do not model how this change in risky behavior 
may influence HIV prevalence. General equilibrium models are required to make that link (see 
                                                 
5
 In the US context, Boozer and Philipson (2000) find that individuals who are surprised by a HIV test results 
change their behavior more. 
6
 Bor et al. (2013) report that in a cohort of people living in rural South Africa, adult life expectancy was 49.2 years 
in 2003, the year before ART became available in the public-sector health system. By 2011, adult life expectancy 
had increased to 60.5 years—an 11.3-year gain. Similar reductions due to the expansion of ART have been 
documented in Malawi and other SSA countries (Floyd et al., 2012). Cohen (2011) reports findings from a clinical 
trial conducted by the HIV Prevention Trials Network showing that ART reduces the risk of heterosexual HIV 
transmission by 96%. 
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for example Greenwood et al., 2013). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework that 
motivates the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the econometric 
specification and Section 5 the analytical sample. Section 6 analyzes the role of subjective 
expectations in the decision to engage in risky sex and considers a series of robustness checks 
such as misreporting of sexual behavior or HIV testing outside the MLSFH surveys. Section 7 
presents the policy simulation results. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Consider a sexually active individual i who has two periods left to live (period 1 and period 2). 
In period 1, she can choose between 2 different actions:  𝑎 = 0, having sex with one partner 
only;  𝑎 = 1, having sex with multiple partners. Her period 1 utility depends on the immediate 
utility from sex 𝑉𝑖(𝑎) associated with action 𝑎. Her period 2 utility is HIV-status-dependent, and 
equals 𝑈𝑖
+ if she is HIV-positive in period 2 and 𝑈𝑖
− if she is HIV-negative in period 2. 
Individual i can enjoy period 2 utility only if she survives to period 2. The subjective probability 
of surviving to period 2 with a given HIV status depends on whether the individual believes that 
she will be infected at the end of period 1. She may believe that she has already been infected 
with HIV before period 1 or that she can contract HIV during period 1. Her subjective 
probability of surviving to period 2 with a given HIV status is therefore a function of the action 
taken in period 1 (since period 1 action may influence HIV status) and her subjective beliefs 𝑓𝑖
1 
of being infected with HIV at the beginning of period 1. For example, if we consider someone 
who believes there is no chance she is infected with HIV at the beginning of period 1 (i.e., 
𝑓𝑖
1 = 0), her subjective probability of surviving to period 2 with a HIV-positive status if she 
engages in action 𝑎 is 𝑝𝑖(𝑎)𝑆𝑖
+
, and her subjective probability of surviving to period 2 with a 
HIV-negative status is (1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑎))𝑆𝑖
−, where 𝑝𝑖(𝑎) is individual i’s subjective probability of 
becoming HIV-positive if she engages in action a, 𝑆𝑖
+ is i’s subjective probability of surviving to 
period 2 conditional on being HIV-positive, and 𝑆𝑖
− is i’s subjective probability of surviving to 
period 2 conditional on being HIV-negative. We further assume that the utility function depends 
on a random term 𝜀𝑖𝑎 that is unobservable to the econometrician and captures heterogeneity in 
tastes. Individual i chooses the action a that maximizes her lifetime subjective expected utility, 
i.e., she solves the following problem: 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎∈{0,1}{𝑉𝑖(𝑎) + 𝑓𝑖
1𝑆𝑖
+𝑈𝑖
+ + (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(𝑎)𝑆𝑖
+𝑈𝑖
+ + (1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑎))𝑆𝑖
−𝑈𝑖
−) + 𝜀𝑖𝑎}. 
Overall, a riskier sexual behavior may increase the direct pleasure from sex in period 1 
but, by potentially increasing the (subjective) risk of becoming HIV-positive, it may also 
decrease the (subjective) probability of surviving to period 2, and therefore of enjoying period 2 
utility at all, while also decreasing the probability of enjoying 𝑈𝑖
− rather than 𝑈𝑖
+.
7
  
 
3. The data: Malawi Longitudinal Study of Families and Health (MLSFH) 
The analyses in this paper are based on the 2006 and 2008 waves of the Malawi 
Longitudinal Study of Families and Health (MLSFH).
8
 The MLSFH is based in three regions of 
rural Malawi: Balaka, Mchinji and Rumphi. Balaka district is located in the Southern Region of 
Malawi, primarily inhabited by Yao-speaking individuals and is predominantly Muslim. Mchinji 
district is located in the Central Region near the border with Zambia. It is primarily inhabited by 
Chewa-speaking individuals, with almost equal proportions of Catholics and Protestants. Rumphi 
district in the Northern Region of the country is inhabited primarily by Tumbuka-speaking 
individuals who are predominantly Protestant. A “Cohort Profile” of the MLSFH, providing 
detailed discussion of MLSFH sampling procedures, survey methods, survey instruments and 
biomarkers, and analyses of attrition is available in Kohler et al. (2014). The MLSFH cohorts 
were selected to represent the rural population, where the majority of Malawians (85%) live in 
poor health conditions similar to those prevailing in other rural SSA low-income countries (over 
60% of total SSA population lives in rural areas): high morbidity/mortality, over-burdened health 
facilities, and frequently unmet nutritional needs. The rural population predominantly engages in 
home production of crops (mostly maize), complemented by small-scale market activities. 
                                                 
7
 Note that the specification of the utility function does not allow for consideration of altruism. One possibility is to 
assume that the decision-maker gets disutility −𝑑𝑖 if she infects her spouse, which could happen with probability 𝑝
𝑠 
if she is HIV+ (which we assume is independent of action a, i.e. whether she has sex with her spouse only or with 
multiple partners). Without loss of generality, let 𝑐𝑖 be a constant such that 𝑈𝑖
+ = 𝑈𝑖
− − 𝑐𝑖 (as in Section 4, it 
measures the cost of living with HIV). The maximization problem presented would become:  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎∈{0,1}{𝑉𝑖(𝑎) +
𝑓𝑖
1𝑆𝑖
+(𝑈𝑖
− − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑝
𝑠𝑑𝑖) + (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(𝑎)𝑆𝑖
+(𝑈𝑖
− − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑝
𝑠𝑑𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑎))𝑆𝑖
−𝑈𝑖
−) + 𝜀𝑖𝑎}. This would mean 
that, if  𝑑𝑖 >0, we would over-estimate (in absolute value) the cost 𝑐𝑖 of living with the HIV. 
8
 Additional information about the MLSFH is available on the project website at http://www.malawi.pop.upenn.edu. 
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HIV/AIDS is widespread, including in the MLSFH study population. Comparisons with the 
Malawi Demographic and Health Survey showed that the MLSFH sample populations are 
reasonably representative of the rural Malawi population (Kohler et al., 2014; Anglewicz et al., 
2007). 
In 2006, the MLSFH included more than 3,200 male and female respondents aged 17 to 
60, who were asked about a wide range of demographic, health, and socio-economic 
characteristics. In 2008, slightly more than 4,000 respondents were interviewed, with the 
additional respondents resulting primarily from a new parent sample that extended the age range 
from 17 to 92 years by also interviewing parents of earlier MLSFH respondents.  
An innovation of the 2006 and 2008 waves was the inclusion of an interactive elicitation 
technique for subjective expectations that was based on asking respondents to allocate up to ten 
beans on a plate to express the likelihood that an event will be realized (Delavande and Kohler, 
2009). Interviewers introduced the interactive elicitation technique with a short introduction (see 
Appendix B). After any clarifying questions, respondents were ﬁrst asked a training question 
about the probability of winning in a local board game (Bawo), followed by a series of 
expectations questions related to economic and health outcomes. They were in particular asked 
about the probability that they are currently infected with HIV, and that their spouse/partner is 
currently infected with HIV. The questionnaire also included several questions about the one-
year, 5-year, and 10-year mortality of the following hypothetical individuals: (i) a woman/man of 
the respondent’s age who is healthy and does not have HIV; (ii) a woman/man of the 
respondent’s age who is infected with HIV; (iii) a woman/man of the respondent’s age who is 
sick with AIDS and is treated with ART. The gender used in the scenarios was the same as that 
of the respondent. Respondents were also asked the probability that someone of the same gender 
who was currently healthy would become infected with HIV in the next 12 months if she (a) is 
married to an HIV-positive spouse, or (b) has several sexual partners in addition to her spouse. 
Respondents were also asked their perception of the village HIV prevalence (from 0 to 10).  
Delavande and Kohler (2009) provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of the 
probabilistic expectations collected using the above interactive elicitation technique.  Key 
findings from the 2006 data include these: (a) About 99% of the respondents are found to 
provide beliefs consistent with basic properties of probability theory when asked about nested 
events; (b) in basically all the considered domains, subjective beliefs vary considerably across 
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individuals; (c) subjective expectations are systematically correlated with observable 
characteristics – such as gender, age, education, and region of residence – in the same way that 
actual outcomes vary with these variables (e.g., expectations about infant mortality exhibit 
regional differences that are similar to actual outcomes, and expectations about economic 
outcomes vary with socio-economic status in the expected directions); and (d) expectations about 
future events vary across individuals in the same way as individuals’ past experience does.  
Another innovative aspect of the MLSFH is the collection of HIV status that incorporated 
in 2004 an experimental design that created exogenous variation in which respondents learned 
the result of the HIV test. Specifically, as part of a randomized experiment to study the 
determinants of HIV testing uptake, respondents were offered a free HIV test at the end of the 
2004 interview (Thornton, 2008). At the time of testing, respondents were given randomly 
assigned vouchers redeemable for a sum of money upon picking up their HIV test results at local 
clinics a couple of months after testing. A quarter of the participants did not receive a positive 
incentive. The remaining three quarters received a positive incentive ranging from 10 to 300 
Kwachas. The average incentive was about 100 Kwachas, equivalent to a day’s wage 
(agricultural labor). Thornton (2008) finds that learning one’s HIV results was highly responsive 
to receiving a positive financial incentive.
9
 In 2006 and 2008, respondents were re-visited by 
nurses shortly after completing the interview and were offered a free at-home HIV test with 
immediate results. There was no financial incentive provided in 2006 and 2008 for learning 
one’s HIV status. In 2006, 93% of the respondents agreed to be tested and 98% of those who 
were tested learned their HIV status. Overall, 5.1% of the tested were HIV-positive. 
Nevertheless, 14% of the sample was not found by the team of nurses at the second visit, and 
were therefore not offered a test (see Table 1). 
Finally, the questionnaire asks several questions about sexual behavior. Of particular 
interest to this paper is the number of sexual partners in the last 12 months, asked in 2008.
10
 We 
use self-reported behavior, which may suffer from reporting biases. In a subsample of the 
                                                 
9
 In 2004, 91% of the respondents agreed to be tested and among those, 69% went to pick up their test result. 
10
 We focus on the number of partners, abstracting from condom use, for several reasons. First, respondents were not 
asked about condom use in 2008. Second, condoms are relatively infrequently used in Malawi, especially in regular 
relationships (Chimbiri, 2007) so the number of sexual partners is likely to be the most important margin of 
behavioral adjustment. Third, women may have limited decision power regarding the use of condom. 
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MLSFH adolescents, sexually transmitted infection (STI) status (which was collected in 2004) 
and self-reported behavior have been found to be positively correlated (Mensch et al., 2008). We 
however do not have STI biomarker information in 2008 to complement our analysis based on 
self-reported sexual behavior.
11
 We discuss the robustness of our results to potential misreporting 
in Section 6.3.2. 
Figure 1 shows the important aspects of the timeline of the data collection. 
 
4. Econometric specification  
Based on section 2, the probability of choosing multiple sexual partners is the probability that the 
action 𝑎𝑖 = 1 yields higher subjective expected utility than the action 𝑎𝑖 = 0, i.e.: 
 
𝑃(𝑎𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃 (
𝑉𝑖(1) + 𝑓𝑖
1𝑆𝑖
+𝑈𝑖
+ + (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1)𝑆𝑖
+𝑈𝑖
+ + (1 − 𝑝𝑖(1))𝑆𝑖
−𝑈𝑖
−) + 𝜀𝑖1 ≥
𝑉𝑖(0) + 𝑓𝑖
1𝑆𝑖
+𝑈𝑖
+ + (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(0)𝑆𝑖
+𝑈𝑖
+ + (1 − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
−𝑈𝑖
−) + 𝜀𝑖0
) 
          = 𝑃 (𝜀𝑖0 − 𝜀𝑖1 ≤ 𝑉𝑖(1) − 𝑉𝑖(0) + (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+𝑈𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−𝑈𝑖
−)). 
 
Without loss of generality, let 𝑐𝑖 be a constant such that 𝑈𝑖
+ = 𝑈𝑖
− − 𝑐𝑖, then we have 
𝑃(𝑎𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃 (
𝜀𝑖0 − 𝜀𝑖1 ≤ 𝑉𝑖(1) − 𝑉𝑖(0) +
(1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−)𝑈𝑖
− − (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
+𝑐𝑖
) (1) 
 
The term 𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0) is the difference in probability of becoming infected with HIV 
between having multiple partners (action 1) versus having one partner (action 0), while the term 
(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) is the difference in survival probability between having multiple 
partners versus one partner for those who believe they are currently not infected with HIV. We 
seek to draw inferences on the structural preference parameters 𝑈𝑖
− and 𝑐𝑖 to evaluate whether 
                                                 
11
 We view self-reported behavior and biomarker as complements because STI status does not have a one-to-one 
relationship with frequency of unprotected sexual behavior (e.g., Fishbein et al., 2000). In the MLSFH context, tests 
of gonorrhoea, chlamydia, and trichomoniasis were conducted in 2004 but were not repeated given their low 
prevalence in the study population (Kohler et al., 2014). The low prevalence suggests that those specific STIs were 
not very common and/or, the STI management for these curable STIs was relatively good, making it a poor proxy 
for risky sexual behavior. Using a standard epidemiological model, Corno and de Paula (2014) find that STI 
biomarkers have a higher probability of misclassification than self-reported behavior in populations with low STI 
prevalence. 
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subjective beliefs are important for decision-making. In particular, we want to evaluate whether 
individuals are forward-looking, and take into account relative survival risk and future disutility 
associated with being infected with HIV when making decisions. 𝑈𝑖
− and 𝑐𝑖 is relevant to the 
decision-making only of those who believe there is a non-zero chance that there are HIV-
negative, i.e. for whom 1 − 𝑓𝑖
1 is different from zero. In our empirical analysis, we will allow 
𝑈𝑖
− and 𝑐𝑖 to vary by gender, age and wealth. 
We use beliefs elicited in 2006 to explain sexual behavior that occurs between 2006 and 
2008 (see Figure 1). The timing is important because sexual behavior may lead individuals to 
revise their beliefs (in particular about current HIV status) subsequently. Therefore, it is critical 
to use beliefs elicited prior to the decision to engage in risky behavior to avoid issues of reverse 
causality. Yet, there may still be some issues in the estimation of equation (1) due to potential 
endogeneity of beliefs arising from the dependence of current beliefs on past behaviors. In 
particular, unobserved heterogeneity capturing time-invariant preferences for the number of 
partners or the search cost of having multiple partners may be correlated with the beliefs , if 
beliefs at the beginning of period 1 depend on the prior number of partners, or if this unobserved 
heterogeneity also influences the decision to get tested for HIV.  
To deal with this concern, we estimate a four-equation model where all random terms are 
allowed to be correlated. The first equation models the 2006 subjective probability  of being 
infected with HIV prior to the 2006 HIV test. It is a reduced-form equation which depends on 
demographic characteristics and lagged sexual behavior 𝑥𝑖4. Note that because 𝑓𝑖
0 is confined to 
the range [0,1], we estimate this equation as a truncated linear regression, as if there was a latent 
variable 𝑓𝑖
0∗ which is observed only when it is between 0 and 1. The second and third equations 
model the process by which someone gets tested for HIV in 2006. This process is important to 
take into consideration in this context if unobserved heterogeneity influencing HIV testing (and 
therefore beliefs about HIV status) also influences the decision to have multiple sex partners. In 
order to get tested for HIV, a respondent has to be found by the team of nurses on the day of the 
HIV test, and she has to agree to get tested. The second equation in the system therefore deals 
with the propensity to be found on the day of the HIV test, 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖
∗
, which depends on 
demographic characteristics and past sexual behavior 𝑥𝑖3, and on the probability  of being 
infected with HIV prior to the 2006 HIV test. The third equation models the decision to get 
1
if
0
if
0
if
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tested for HIV, 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡∗, conditional on being found on the day of the test, which depends on 
demographic characteristics and past sexual behavior 𝑥𝑖2, and on the probability  of being 
infected with HIV prior to the 2006 HIV test. Finally, the last equation, which is the one of 
substantive interest, models the propensity to have multiple partners 𝑎𝑖
∗. As defined in equation 
(1), it will depend on the difference in immediate utility from sex associated with having 
multiple partners and one partner, which we assume depends on demographic characteristics and 
lagged sexual behavior (i.e., 𝑉𝑖(1) − 𝑉𝑖(0) = 𝛽𝑥𝑖1)), and on the two subjective beliefs (1 −
𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) and (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
+ that characterize how subjective 
survival probabilities affect decisions about risky sexual behaviors. Note that those beliefs 
include the potentially endogenous post 2006 HIV test belief , which is equal to the pre-test 
belief if a respondent did not get tested for HIV in 2006 or to the actual 2006 HIV status if 
the respondent got tested for HIV in 2006. The system of equations (2) (along with the law of 
motion of the probability 𝑓𝑖) is formally given by the following set of equations:
12
 
        
2006 pre-test probability 𝑓𝑖
0 of being currently infected with HIV: 
           𝑓𝑖
0∗ = 𝛽4𝑥𝑖4 + 𝜀𝑖4 
with 𝑓𝑖
0 = 𝑓𝑖
0∗ if 0 ≤ 𝑓𝑖
0∗ ≤ 1         (2.4) 
and 𝑓𝑖
0 unobserved otherwise. 
 
Found by MLSFH nurse team for HIV test in 2006: 
𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖
∗ = 𝛽3𝑥𝑖3 + 𝛾3𝑓𝑖
0 + 𝜀𝑖3                
                                   𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖
∗ > 0                             (2.3) 
𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
 
Participation in MLSFH HIV test in 2006: 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖
∗ = 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 + 𝛾2𝑓𝑖
0 + 𝜀𝑖2  
                                       𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖
∗ > 0                                 (2.2) 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 is observed only if 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 1            
 
2006 post-test probability of being currently infected with HIV, : 
𝑓𝑖
1 = 0 if 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 1 and test result is negative 
𝑓𝑖
1 = 1 if 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 1 and test result is positive 
                                                 
12
 We number equations in a decreasing order to reflect the fact that equation (2.1) is the one of substantive research 
interest, that we therefore present in the first column of our results tables. 
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𝑓𝑖
1 = 𝑓𝑖
0 if 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 0 or 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 0 
 
Having multiple partners in 2008, 𝑎𝑖: 
𝑎𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝑈𝑖
−𝑃𝑢 − 𝑐𝑖𝑃𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖1    
                                        𝑎𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑖
∗ > 0                  (2.1) 
𝑎𝑖 = 0 otherwise. 
   
The correlation of the residuals across equations 2.4-2.1 is given by 
(
𝜀1
𝜀2
𝜀3
𝜀4
) = 𝑁
(
 
 
(
0
0
0
0
) ,(
1 𝜌12 𝜌13 𝜌14
𝜌12 1 𝜌23 𝜌24
𝜌13 𝜌23 1 𝜌34
𝜌14 𝜌24 𝜌34 𝜌44
)
)
 
 
, 
 
and 𝑃𝑢 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) and 𝑃𝑐 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
+ are 
subjective probabilities, discussed in more detail below, that affect the decision to have multiple 
sexual partners. 
  We seek to estimate the parameters {𝛽4, 𝛽3, 𝛾3, 𝛽2, 𝛾2, 𝛽1, 𝑈𝑖
−, 𝑐𝑖}. Equation (2.4) is a 
truncated linear regression (without mass point at 0 or 1) while equations (2.3), (2.2) and (2.4) 
are probit regressions, for which the variance of the random term is normalized to 1. The system 
is partially recursive in the sense that 𝑓𝑖
0, the dependent variable in (2.4), is an independent 
variable in equations (2.2) and (2.3) and enters indirectly in (2.1) through  𝑓𝑖
1 (because 𝑓𝑖
1 = 𝑓𝑖
0 
for respondents who have not been tested for HIV). But note that the dependent variables 
𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖
∗
 in (2.3) or 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡∗ in (2.2) are not independent variables in (2.1) (Equations (2.2), (2.3) 
and (2.1) are in fact seemingly unrelated). Identification requires therefore at least one variable in 
𝑥𝑖4 not included in 𝑥𝑖3, 𝑥𝑖2 and 𝑥𝑖1 (Maddala, 1983, Chapter 5.7, model 4) -- but does not require 
a variable in 𝑥𝑖3, 𝑥𝑖2 not included in 𝑥𝑖1 since the dependent variables of equation (2.3) and (2.2) 
do not enter equation (2.1). Note also that Equations (2.2) and (2.3) consist of a classic probit 
model of sample selection, with (2.3) being the selection equation. For the identification not to 
rely purely on functional form, the selection equation should have at least one variable that is not 
in the probit equation, i.e. we need a variable in 𝑥𝑖3 not in 𝑥𝑖2 (Van de Ven and Van Pragg, 
1981). We discuss our exclusion restrictions in details in Section 5.3. We will estimate the 
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system of equations (2) by maximum likelihood.
13
 We cluster standard errors at the couple level.  
 
5. Analytic sample and definition of the variables 
5.1. Analytic sample 
Different samples are used to estimate the various equations of the system (2). We use all 
2006 MLSFH respondents to estimate equations (2.4) and (2.3), and the 2006 respondents who 
were found by the team of nurses for testing for equation (2.2). We use the 2008 MLSFH 
respondents who have been sexually active in the 12 months prior to the survey for our analysis 
of sexual behavior.
14
 We also exclude 202 men who are in a polygamous marriage and have 
therefore multiple sexual partners within marriage. Our empirical strategy relies on estimating 
whether sexual behavior in the last 12 months reported in 2008 is influenced by elicited beliefs 
reported in 2006. However, 23% of the 2006 respondents could not be resurveyed in 2008, so 
their behavior cannot be used to make inference on 𝑈𝑖
− and 𝑐𝑖. We investigate in Section 6.3.4 
the robustness of our results when we take attrition into consideration. Table 1 presents basic 
characteristics of the 2006 respondents, and of the 2008 respondents who answered the 2006 
probabilistic expectations.
15
  
5.2. Definition of variables 
We start by describing the dependent variables in the system of equations (2). Table 2 
presents their descriptive statistics. 
- 2006 pre-test probability of being currently infected with HIV. The variable  is the 
respondent’s answer about the likelihood of being currently infected with HIV, elicited in 2006 
(and re-scaled from zero to 1 by dividing the number of beans by 10). The average belief is 0.11. 
However, the distribution is skewed: 66 percent of the respondents report a probability of zero of 
being currently infected with HIV. We plot in Figure 2 the distribution of subjective probability 
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 We use the cmp Stata command developed by Roodman (2011). The likelihood function for the fully recursive 
model is given on page 176 of Roodman (2011) while the likelihood function for the truncated model is given by 
equation (5). 
14
 We establish the robustness of our results to the inclusion of non-sexually active respondents in Section 6.3.3.  
15
 Our analytical sample includes respondents who have been tested for HIV and found out that they were HIV+ in 
2004. Whether we include them or not does not change our results. Note also that we also include respondents who 
learned they were HIV+ in 2006 in the estimation of equation (2.4). For those, the beliefs 𝑃𝑢 and 𝑃𝑐 are equal to 
zero. Whether we exclude them or not does not change our results. 
0
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of being currently infected with HIV elicited in 2006, according to their actual 2006 HIV status 
(2006 test result not known by respondents at the time of the survey). Subjective beliefs range 
between zero and one, though a large proportion is concentrated at zero. However, the 
concentration at zero varies by HIV status, with 40 percent of the HIV-positive individuals 
reporting a zero chance, compared to 68 percent of the HIV-negative individuals. We also note 
that 11 percent of the HIV-positive report a probability one of being infected, compared to less 
than 1 percent of the HIV-negatives. The distribution of those who tested negative and those who 
did not get tested is very similar. 
- Found for HIV test. We define the variable 𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 1 if the respondent was found by the 
team of nurses conducting HIV test in 2006, and 0 otherwise. Overall, 86 percent of respondents 
interviewed as part of the main survey in 2006 were found by the team of nurses. 
- HIV testing. We define the variable  if the respondent agreed to be tested and learned 
his HIV status at the end of the 2006 interview, and 0 otherwise (conditional on being found). 
Overall, 90 percent of the respondents who were found by the team of nurses learned their HIV 
status in 2006. 
- Having multiple partners in 2008. The variable 𝑎𝑖 is equal to 1 if the respondent reports in 
2008 having had more than 1 sexual partner in the last 12 months, and zero if the respondent 
reports having had only one sexual partner in the last 12 months. Table 2 shows that among 
respondents who were sexually active in 2008, 13% had more than one sexual partner. Note 
however that there is a large difference in self-reports about multiple partnerships by gender: this 
percentage is 22% among males compared to 2% among females. 
 
We now describe how we construct the two individual-specific subjective beliefs 
 𝑃𝑢 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) and 𝑃𝑐 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
+ that are critical 
for the decision to have multiple sexual partners. The former reflects the difference in survival 
probability between having multiple partners versus one partner for those who believe they are 
currently not infected with HIV, multiplied by the probability of being not infected with HIV; the 
latter reflects the difference in the probability of surviving to period 2 with HIV between having 
multiple partners versus one partner for those who believe they are currently not infected with 
HIV, multiplied by the probability of being not infected with HIV. Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the various relevant expectations for respondents who were sexually 
1itest 
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active in 2008. 
- 2006 post-test probability of being currently infected with HIV, . We define the 
variable  as follows: 
 
0 if the respondent learned that s/he was HIV-negative in 2006 HIV test 
 
 
 
1 if the respondent learned that s/he was HIV-positive in 2006 HIV test 
 
 
  if the respondent did not learn his/her HIV status in 2006 
 
The underlying assumption is that individuals revised their belief upon learning their HIV status 
according to the test result.
16
 We evaluate the robustness of our results to this assumption in 
Section 6.3.5. Table 3 shows that the average post-test probability is equal to 0.05 and is thus 
lower than the pre-test probability, due to the fact that a large number of respondents who were 
tested found out that they were HIV-negative. 
- Survival expectations, 𝑆𝑖
+ and 𝑆𝑖
−. We use the 2006 elicited 10-year mortality rate of a 
hypothetical individual of respondent’s gender, age and village currently being infected with 
HIV to determine 𝑆𝑖
+ and the 2006 elicited 10-year mortality rate of a hypothetical individual of 
respondent’s gender and age currently healthy to determine 𝑆𝑖
−.
17
 Table 3 shows that on average 
respondents think that there is a 41 percent chance of being alive in 10 years conditional on 
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 There is no empirical evidence on how people revise their beliefs just after learning their test results. In Delavande 
and Kohler (2012), we report that about two-thirds of respondents who learn they were HIV-negative in 2004 
allocated zero beans when asked their beliefs of infection in 2006. Because individuals may have subsequently 
engaged in risky behavior, this pattern in the data is consistent with our current updating assumption. More 
surprisingly, only 10% of the respondents who were told they were HIV-positive in 2004 provided 10 beans in 
response to the question about their subjective probability of being infected with HIV in 2006. Delavande and 
Kohler (2012) consider various explanations: (i) respondents may have believed the test result at first, but have 
“forgotten” about it or reassessed their status as time elapsed, specifically if they had continued to feel fairly healthy; 
and (ii) respondents may actually believe that they are HIV-positive, but were embarrassed to acknowledge it vis-à-
vis the interviewer during the 2006 survey. Several results lead us to believe that embarrassment may be an issue: 
respondents are more likely to report zero beans in places with more HIV-related stigma, and learning a HIV-
positive status lead to a change in behavior that reduces the HIV infection risk to others, suggesting an underlying 
change in beliefs about HIV status. 
17
 With respect to the model, the definition of the survival probability variables implies that our empirical analysis 
focuses on the following trade-off: direct utility from sex now versus higher chance of survival in 10 years. Given 
the delay between HIV infection through sexual behaviours and mortality, relating sexual behaviour within a 1-year 
horizon to mortality over a 10-year horizon is conceptually consistent with the basic epidemiology of HIV. For 
example, Morgan et al. (2002) report a median time from seroconversion to death of 9.8 years in rural Uganda. 
1
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being healthy, compared to only a 12 percent chance of being alive in 10 years conditional on 
being infected with HIV. This shows that individuals are aware that being infected with HIV 
reduce life expectancy in the long run. Panel A of Table 4 shows the average survival beliefs by 
age group for someone healthy, infected with HIV, and sick with AIDS, and sick with AIDS but 
treated with anti-retroviral therapy (ART). It shows a gradient of survival expectations by age: 
younger people expect to live longer. It also shows that for all age groups, individuals are aware 
that being infected with HIV will shorten life expectancy substantially, and that being on ART 
will mitigate this. Comparisons with survival rates from other studies further highlights that 
individuals are pessimistic about survival. 
- Subjective probability of infection associated with having multiple partners, 𝑝𝑖(1). We use 
the 2006 elicited expectations about the likelihood that a hypothetical individual of the 
respondent’s gender and village would become infected with HIV in the next 12 months if s/he 
was having several sexual partners in addition to a spouse. Respondents believe on average that 
there is an 77 percent chance of becoming infected with HIV conditional on having multiple 
partners (Table 3). 
-  Subjective probability of infection associated with having one partner, 𝑝𝑖(0). This 
probability is again individual-specific and depends on respondents’ belief about the status of 
their main partner. It is defined as 𝑝𝑖(0) = Π𝑖 × 𝑓𝑝𝑖
1
, where Π𝑖 is person i’s perceived likelihood 
of becoming infected with HIV during the next 12 months for someone who is married to an 
HIV-positive individual and 𝑓𝑝𝑖
1
 is i’s subjective beliefs about her partner’s HIV status after the 
2006 HIV test and before engaging in action 𝑎𝑖. Note that a respondent may not know the test 
result of her spouse if the latter did not share the results. We assume that a respondent learned 
the status of her spouse after the 2006 HIV test if, in 2008, she reports that the last time her 
spouse got tested, he shared his test results with her, and if the last time occurred during the 2006 
MLSFH data collection period. So we define 𝑓𝑝𝑖
1
 as follows: 
 19 
 
 
Respondents believe on average that there is a 93 percent chance of becoming infected with HIV 
within 12 months if one is married to an HIV-positive spouse, while the average partner’s 
probability of being infected with HIV is 8 percent. Overall, the average subjective probability of 
becoming infected with HIV within 12 months, conditional on having sex with one partner, is 8 
percent, which is about one-tenth the perceived chance of becoming infected conditional on 
having multiple partners.
18
 So, overall, respondents believe that having multiple partners puts 
them at a substantially greater risk of becoming infected with HIV.   
Panel B of Table 4 shows the 2006 average subjective probabilities of becoming infected 
with HIV by 2006 HIV status (not known to the respondents at the time of the survey). We find 
that the subjective probability of infection associated with having multiple partners, 𝑝𝑖(1), and 
the probability of infection if married to an HIV-positive individual, Π𝑖, are similar by HIV 
status. However, the subjective probability of infection associated with having one partner, 
𝑝𝑖(0), is larger for respondents who are HIV-positive compared to the HIV-negative and the 
non-tested. This is driven by  the higher post-test subjective probability of a partner being 
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 Note that our analysis used beliefs regarding the transmission of HIV 𝑝𝑖(0) and Π𝑖 that were elicited in 2006 
before respondents had the opportunity to get tested and learned their HIV status. Potentially, upon learning their 
status, respondents could have updated not only their beliefs about their own HIV status but also their beliefs about 
the transmission of HIV associated with various behaviors. This would be problematic only for respondents who are 
HIV-negative (as those transmission risk expectations would not enter the decision problem of individuals who 
found out that they are HIV-positive). In Delavande and Kohler (2012), we investigate the causal impact of learning 
HIV status in 2004 on elicited 2006 HIV/AIDS-related expectations using an instrumental-variable approach. We 
find that, among HIV-negative individuals, learning one’s status had no impact on expectations about transmission 
risk. This suggests that 2006 beliefs about transmission risk are unlikely to have been revised after the 2006 HIV test 
by respondents who found out that they were HIV-negative. 
0
if the spouse learned that s/he was HIV-negative in the 2006 HIV test 
and the respondent reports that the spouse shared test results
1
if the spouse learned that s/he was HIV-positive in the 2006 HIV test 
and the respondent reports that the spouse shared test results
2006 elicited beliefs 
about spouse’s status
if the spouse did not learn his/her HIV status in 2006 or the respondent 
reports that the spouse did not share
Beliefs about village 
prevalence
if the respondent did not report having a main partner in 2006
1
pif 
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infected with HIV.  
 Figure 3 shows the distribution of the difference in the probability of being alive in 10 
years by HIV status (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) according to the number of sexual partners (one versus 2 or 
more). It shows that respondents who believe that HIV substantially reduce their survival (i.e., 
those for whom (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) ranges between -0.6 to -0.4) are more likely to have only one partner 
while respondents who believe that HIV does not have a large impact of survival  (i.e., those for 
whom (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) ranges between -0.3 to 0) are more likely to have multiple sex partners.19 This 
is consistent with the idea that those who expect HIV to have a large negative impact on survival 
choose a safer sexual behavior.  Figure 2 also shows the distribution of the difference in the 
probability of becoming infected with HIV, 𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0), rounded to the first decimal. The 
patterns are less clear than for the survival probability but it shows that among those who believe 
the difference to be the largest (i.e., equal to one), there are a more individuals having one sex 
partner than multiple. Again, this would be consistent with the idea that those who view the 
difference in transmission risk to be large choose a safer sexual behavior. 
Finally, we include in all equations basic demographic characteristics (e.g., age, marital 
status, education, land ownership, region) and an indicator for whether the respondents report 0, 
1, or more than 1 sexual partners in the 2006 interview, as those are thought to influence the 
2008 sexual behavior, the propensity to be found for the HIV test, the testing decision, and pre-
test beliefs about HIV status. We also include indicators for religion, as religion may influence 
risky behavior and risk perceptions (e.g., Trinitapoli and Regnerus, 2006). 
 
5.3. Exclusion restrictions 
As pointed out in Section 4, identification requires at least one variable in 𝑥𝑖4 not included in 
𝑥𝑖3, 𝑥𝑖2 and 𝑥𝑖1. We use two variables for this purpose. First, we take advantage of the 
randomized experiment that was conducted in 2004 in which participants were provided 
randomized financial incentives (equal on average to 102 Kwacha, which corresponds 
approximately to a day’s agricultural labor wage at the time) for learning one’s HIV status and 
use an indicator for whether a respondent received a positive financial incentive as excluded 
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 The difference in mortality risk is between -0.6 and 0 for 94% of the respondents. 
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variable. The idea is that individuals provided with a positive financial incentive were more 
likely to learn their HIV status in 2004 (Thornton, 2008), which would influence their 2006 
beliefs about whether they are infected with HIV. Seventy-five percent of the participants 
received a positive financial incentive. Thornton (2008) notes that 34 percent of the participants 
receiving a zero incentive learned their HIV results, while even the smallest incentive doubled 
that share. However, receiving a positive financial incentive in 2004 should not influence the 
propensity to be found by the team of nurses conducting HIV test in 2006, which is distinct from 
the participation in HIV testing and is largely determined by fieldwork logistics that affect the 
time and day of the visit attempts, nor should it directly influence the decision to have multiple 
sex partners in 2008.
20
 Note that it could influence the decision to get tested in 2006 (if for 
example, people become less scared of getting tested for HIV once they have already been 
tested) so we do not exclude it from equation (2.3).  
About 30 percent of the respondents did not participate in the 2004 HIV test (Table 1). 
Among those who were offered the test, only 9 percent refused to get tested.  The remaining 
share included individuals who were not eligible, not found at the time of the 2004 HIV test 
(short-term migration/mobility is relatively common in rural Malawi) or not interviewed in 2004. 
We therefore use another variable that will be excluded from equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3). 
This is the 2006 elicited probability that a hypothetical healthy individual of the respondent’s 
gender and village would become infected with HIV in the next 12 months with normal sexual 
behavior. The motivation is that this subjective probability should be related to a respondent’s 
own probability of being infected. For example, consider a respondent who believed she was not 
infected with HIV 12 months prior to the survey and who also considers that she has had normal 
sexual behavior in that period. Her 2006 subjective probability of being infected with HIV 
should be equal to that reported for the hypothetical individual.
21
 However, once we condition on 
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 Those who received a positive financial incentive are as likely to be found by the team of nurses in 2006 as those 
who received a zero incentive (92.19% vs. 91.05%, P-value for t-test of equality of mean is 0.400). Similarly, those 
who received a positive incentive are as likely to have multiple partners as those who received a zero incentive 
(12.20% vs. 12.34%, P-value for t-test of equality of mean is 0.948). 
21
 More generally, let 𝑓𝑖
−1 be i’s subjective beliefs of being infected with HIV 12 months prior to the 2006 survey. 
We have 𝑓𝑖
0 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
−1) × 𝑃𝑖(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) + 𝑓𝑖
−1. Let denote by 𝑇𝑖  the 2006 elicited probability that 
a hypothetical healthy individual of the respondent’s gender would become infected with HIV in the next 12 months 
with normal sexual behavior. If the respondent had normal sexual behavior, we have 
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the individual subjective probability of being infected with HIV and the subjective probability of 
becoming infected when having one and when having multiple sexual partners, the subjective 
probability that a hypothetical individual would become infected with HIV in the next 12 months 
with normal sexual behavior should be irrelevant to the HIV testing decision, the propensity to 
be found by the team of nurses, or the propensity to have multiple partners.
22
 
In order not to rely solely on functional form assumption, the selection equation (2.3) should 
also have at least one variable that is not in the probit equation for HIV testing (2.2), i.e. we need 
a variable in 𝑥𝑖3 not in 𝑥𝑖2. We use an indicator for whether the first attempted visit of the team 
of nurses conducting the 2006 HIV test was within one week of the first attempted visit of the 
2006 survey team. A short time span between attempted visits, which is purely due to logistical 
considerations in the field, is likely to increase the propensity to be found, without affecting 
directly the testing decision. Both the survey team and the team of nurses made three attempts to 
find a respondent. Note that we used the first attempted visit date rather than actual survey date 
because (i) it is defined even for respondents who were not found and (ii) the interview date may 
not be fully exogenous (e.g., if respondents who have been interviewed on the third visit are 
systematically different than respondents who have been interviewed on the first visit). Our 
results are unchanged if we use 10 days or two weeks rather than a one week gap between visits. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 6.1. Baseline Results 
We start by assuming that 𝑈− and 𝑐 are identical for all respondents. Table 5 presents the 
average marginal effects of the maximum-likelihood estimation results of equation (2).
23
 In the 
first column of Table 5, where the indicator for having multiple partners is used as a dependent 
                                                                                                                                                             
𝑃𝑖(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) = 𝑇𝑖. If respondent i had a sexual behavior different from “normal,” then 
𝑃𝑖(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠) = 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖, where 𝑑𝑖 may be positive if i had sexual activity above “normal” or 
negative if i had sexual activity below “normal.” The magnitude of 𝑑 may depend on past sexual activity and other 
demographic characteristics. Note that we do not observe 𝑓𝑖
−1. Yet, based on this framework, we expect 𝑇𝑖  to be a 
strong predictor of 𝑓𝑖
0. 
22
 For each of the variables (𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖, 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖), we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean belief of becoming 
infected with HIV in the next 12 months with normal sexual behavior is different for those whose variable equals 1 
and for those whose variable equals zero, using a t-test. 
23
 We present the coefficients for the truncated regression (2.4), i.e. the marginal effects for 𝑓𝑖
0∗. 
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variable (equation 2.1), we find that the average marginal effect of the subjective belief 𝑃𝑢 =
(1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) is positive (equal to 0.097) and statistically significant at 
5%. That is, an increase from the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of 𝑃𝑢 increases the probability of having 
multiple sex partners by 2 percentage points (which corresponds to a 15% increase in the 
probability of having multiple partners). Suppose that (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1) and (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) are evaluated at 
their mean, then an increase of (𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0)) from zero to 1 would reduce the propensity to 
have multiple sex partners by 2.7 percentage points. Similarly, suppose that (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1) and 
(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0)) are evaluated at their means, then a decrease in (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) from zero to minus 1 
would decrease the propensity to have multiple sex partners by 6.4 percentage points. Similarly, 
if (𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0)) and (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) are evaluated at their means, then an increase in 𝑓𝑖
1 from zero 
to 1 would reduce the propensity to have multiple sex partners by 2.0 percentage points. This 
provides evidence that individuals are forward-looking and take into consideration subjective 
expectations about relative mortality risk, HIV status, and transmission rates when making 
decisions related to sexual behavior.  
We find however that the marginal effect of the belief 𝑃𝑐 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
+, 
which relates to the disutility −𝑐 associated with being HIV-positive rather HIV-negative, is 
negative as expected but much smaller in absolute value than the marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢, and is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. This suggests that the stage of sickness is not taken 
into consideration in the decision to have multiple sexual partners. Rather than the threat of being 
sick with HIV/AIDS, it is the threat of dying early that motivates safe sex strategies. 
Looking at the other marginal effects that are precisely estimated, we find, as already 
noted in Table 2, that women are much less likely to have multiple partners than men. Also, 
married respondents are much less likely to have multiple partners. Respondents who have had 
multiple sexual partners in the past are much more likely to continue this behavior: the marginal 
effect is of similar magnitude (in absolute) as the marginal effect of the female dummy, and 
precisely estimated (statistically significant at 1%).  
The second column of Table 5 presents the average marginal effects for the propensity to 
be found by the teams of nurses conducting HIV testing in 2006. We note that the excluded 
variable, i.e. an indicator for whether the time difference between the survey team’s first 
attempted visit and the nurses’ first attempted visit is less than a week, is positive and precisely 
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estimated (P-value=0.001). Older respondents are also more likely to be found, along with non-
married individuals and those having a higher subjective probability of being infected with HIV. 
A possible explanation is that that those who are sick (and thus with a higher belief of being 
infected) are more likely to be home during the nurses’ visit. 
The third column of Table 5 presents the average marginal effects for the HIV testing 
decision, conditional on being found by the team of nurses. Married respondents are less likely to 
agree to testing, while those who have had multiple partners in the past and those who have 
received a positive financial incentive in the 2004 HIV testing experiment are more likely to 
agree.  
Finally, the last column of Tables 5 presents the average marginal effects for the equation 
using the pre-HIV-test subjective probability of being HIV-positive as dependent variable. 
Importantly, our excluded variables are strong predictor of this pre-HIV-test probability (P-
value=0.048 for having received a positive financial incentive and P-value=0.059 for the belief 
of becoming infected with HIV in the next 12 months with normal sexual behavior, and P-
value=0.032 for a test of joint significance). We see that other characteristics influence beliefs in 
the same way as they influence actual HIV status: female and those who had multiple partners in 
the past report higher chances of being infected with HIV. 
The bottom panel of Table 5 shows estimates of the variances and covariances of the 
random terms. We find that 𝜌24 is statistically significantly different from zero at 5%, suggesting 
that there is a (negative) correlation between the random terms of the beliefs about HIV status 
equation and the HIV testing equation. However, the covariance between the random term 𝜀1 of 
the equation estimating the propensity to have multiple sex partners and the other equations is 
not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that, in this context, there is no 
endogeneity issue when estimating the impact of HIV-related expectations on having multiple 
sexual partners.
24
 
Because the credibility of the results relies on the credibility of the exclusion restrictions, 
we also conducted additional regressions to obtain estimates for 𝑈− and 𝑐 when the residual 
                                                 
24
 Indeed, we do find estimates and standard errors very similar to those reported in the first column of table 5 if (i) 
we estimate a simple probit model for the decision to have multiple sexual partner, or (ii) we estimate the system of 
equations (2) without any exclusion restrictions. 
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correlation 𝜌14 is fixed to certain levels in the system of equations (2). Table A1 shows that 
results are qualitatively similar when 𝜌14varies between -0.5 to 0.3, with the magnitude of the 
average marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢 being actually larger when the correlation is negative. Only when 
the 𝜌14 is equal to 0.5 do we get an average marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢 that is about 2/3 of the value 
reported in Table 5 and is imprecisely estimated. This suggests that the endogeneity issue would 
have to be quite severe for our results to indicate substantively different conclusions. 
Note that while we estimate (2.4) as a truncated linear regression, our results are 
essentially unchanged if we estimate this relation as a simple linear regression. One may also 
wonder whether our second excluded variable, the “probability that a hypothetical healthy 
individual of the respondent’s gender and village would become infected with HIV in the next 12 
months with normal sexual behavior,” is distinct enough from the two other transmission 
probabilities that are present in equation (2.1) to be an adequate excluded variable. Specifically, 
these two other transmission probabilities included in equation (2.1) are “the subjective 
probability that a hypothetical healthy individual of the respondent’s gender and village would 
become infected with HIV in the next 12 months if married to an HIV-positive individual,” Π𝑖, 
and “the subjective probability that a hypothetical healthy individual of the respondent’s gender 
and village would become infected with HIV in the next 12 months if has several sexual partners 
in addition to spouse,” 𝑝𝑖(1). First, we note that there is considerable variation across the three 
subjective probabilities. For example, the sample average transmission probability with normal 
sexual behavior is 0.22, while, as shown in Table 3, it is 0.77 for the transmission probability 
with multiple partners and 0.93 for the probability if married to a HIV-positive spouse. Second, 
we re-estimate the system of equations using all three transmission probabilities in equation 
(2.4). The precision of the excluded variable “having received a positive financial incentive” is 
unaffected, while the one of the transmission risk with normal sexual behavior diminishes 
somewhat (p-value=0.132). We also evaluated the robustness of the precision of the excluded 
variables in this augmented equation (2.4) to other functional forms assumptions. We find that 
the two excluded variables are still precisely estimated, and with similar magnitude in terms of 
marginal effect, when using a linear regression or a generalized linear model with a logit link and 
binomial distribution, sometimes called fractional logit, developed by Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996) –estimated outside of the system. 
  
 26 
6.2. Heterogeneity in preferences 
In the previous section, we allowed heterogeneity in preferences for having multiple 
partners but not in the parameters 𝑈− and 𝑐. We now relax this and first allow the parameters to 
vary by gender. Because men and women do report quite different levels of multiple 
partnerships, we also allow men and women to have different preferences for having multiple 
partners by interacting marital status, lagged sexual behavior, and age with female. The 
motivation for those interactions is that the psychological or social cost for having extra-marital 
affairs may differ for married men and married women; the level of lagged sexual behavior is 
quite different by gender, and women’s peak of HIV infection is at an earlier age than men’s, 
suggesting different sexual behavior by age for men and women. We have also experimented 
interacting our excluded variables in the other equations of the system (2) by gender but never 
found a statistically significant coefficient for the interacted terms at conventional level. The 
other equations are therefore unchanged compared to table 5. Because of this, we only present 
the estimation results for equation (2.1). 
 The first column of Table 6 shows the average marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢 and 𝑃𝑐  for males and 
females respectively. For ease of interpretation of the results, we present the average marginal 
effect of 𝑃𝑢 for males and the average marginal effect for 𝑃𝑢 for females (rather than showing the 
main marginal effect and the marginal effect for the interaction with the female dummy). We do 
the same for the estimates of the marginal effect of 𝑃𝑐. The average marginal effects of the male 
and female 𝑃𝑢  are positive and statistically significant at 10%. While the estimate for females is 
twice as large as the one for males, we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal (P-
value=0.463). As in Table 5, the average marginal effect for 𝑐 are small in magnitude and not 
statistically significantly different from zero. None of the interactions with female are 
statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels (Table A2), suggesting that 
the effect of marital status, age and lagged sexual behavior on having multiple sexual partners is 
identical for men and women.
25
 
 Utility in 10 years may be valued differently by different age groups. We therefore now 
allow for additional heterogeneity in preferences by having the parameters 𝑈− and 𝑐 differing by 
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 Note that there are very few women aged 50+ who have multiple sexual partners, so we cannot in practice identify 
the interaction female with age above 50. We therefore just have a dummy for female aged 40+. 
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both gender and age. We maintain the interaction of marital status, age and lagged sexual 
behavior with female, as in the previous specification. The second column of Table 6 shows the 
average marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢 and 𝑃𝑐 for males and females above and below 30 years old, 
respectively. The average marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢  is positive and statistically significant at 5% for 
females who are less than 29 and males who are above 30, suggesting that survival expectations 
are more relevant for younger women and older men in the decision to engage in risky sex. Note 
that these are the age groups at which HIV prevalence tends to peak in Malawi and other SSA 
countries. We do reject the equality of the estimates of 𝑈−for the four age-group/gender 
categories at 10% (P-value=0.055). As earlier, the marginal effects of 𝑃𝑐 are imprecisely 
estimated. 
 Future utility may also vary depending on individual wealth. We investigate this by 
allowing the parameters 𝑈−  and 𝑐 to differ by gender and wealth. We proxy wealth by land 
ownership. We define high wealth as the highest land ownership tertile. The last column of Table 
6 shows that average marginal effects of 𝑃𝑢 are more precisely estimated for high wealth females 
and males (P-value=0.058 and 0.115 respectively), which is consistent with the idea that 
wealthier individuals may value future utility more. We however cannot reject the equality of the 
4 estimates of 𝑈− by wealth (P-value=0.673). Again, the marginal effects of 𝑃𝑐 are imprecisely 
estimated. 
 
6.3. Robustness checks  
6.3.1. HIV testing between 2006 and 2008 
So far, we have assumed that the only way to get tested for HIV was through the MLSFH 
survey. However, HIV testing is becoming more common in Malawi, and some respondents 
reported that they had been tested between the 2006 and the 2008 waves. Overall, 16.5% of 
respondents reported in 2008 that they had been tested for HIV between the 2006 interview and 
December 2007, and this proportion is 12.1% for respondents who did not learn their HIV status 
as part of the 2006 MLSFH HIV testing. We may therefore have measurement error in beliefs 
about current infection for those who got tested outside of the MLSFH. To deal with this, we 
assume that the HIV status that they learned in between the 2006 MLSFH testing and December 
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2007 is the same as the results of the 2008 MLSFH HIV test.
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We re-estimate the system of equation (2) based on those assumptions for the case of 
homogenous 𝑈− and 𝑐 and when they vary by gender and age. The first two columns of Table 
A3 presents the results of the equation with having multiple sexual partners as the dependent 
variable and shows that the results are very similar to those of Tables 5 and 6 (column 2). 
 
6.3.2. Misreporting of sexual behavior 
Table 2 shows a large difference in reported sexual behavior by gender. This difference 
by gender is typical of many surveys done in SSA. Dinkelman and Lam (2009) for example 
indicate that in 9 recent African Demographic and Health Surveys, men report between 10% and 
80% more sexual partners than women. They point out that in a closed population without 
misreporting and with everyone sampled, the average number of partners of men and women 
should balance. In our analytical sample, the average number of partners in the last 12 months is 
1.41 and 1.11 for men and women respectively. However, Dinkelman and Lam (2009) also 
highlight that a disequilibrium of partner reports may occur without misreporting when there is 
undersampling of sex workers. Yet, because sexual behavior is a sensitive topic, misreporting is 
a legitimate concern. To evaluate the robustness of our results to misreporting, we follow 
Hausman et al. (1998), who correct for misclassification and estimate its prevalence. A similar 
measurement error strategy was introduced in this context by de Paula et al. (2014). We assume 
that individuals report truthfully when they do not have multiple partners and misreport about 
having multiple partners. This probability of misreporting is assumed to depend on the true 
sexual behavior value ?̃?𝑖, and on other observable characteristics 𝑧𝑖. In particular, it is given by: 
𝛼1(𝑧𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑎𝑖 = 0|?̃?𝑖 = 1, 𝑧𝑖) 
With this misreporting probability, we have: 
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 This is accurate for those who tested negative in 2008, but may potentially be a strong assumption for those who 
tested positive in 2008, as some may have sero-converted after their latest test. But HIV-incidence in the MLSFH 
and other population-based studies in generally low (in the MLSFH, incidence during 2004—08 was .63 per 100 
person years; Kohler et al, 2014), and thus sero-conversions during a 1-2 year period are relatively rare.  Among 
those who were sexually active in 2008 and did learn their HIV status in 2006 and report being tested after the 2006 
interview, 4.9% tested positive in 2008 and 9.4% refused to get tested. For the latter group (12 observations), we use 
the 2006 elicited beliefs about current infected status as the beliefs used for decision-making. Among those who got 
tested as part of the 2006 MLSFH and got re-tested before December 2007, less than 1% (corresponding to two 
respondents) changed HIV status and tested positive in the 2008 MLSFH.  
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𝐸(𝑎𝑖|𝑥𝑖1, 𝑃𝑢, 𝑃𝑐 , 𝑧𝑖) = (1 − 𝛼1(𝑧𝑖))Φ(𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝑈
−𝑃𝑢 − 𝑐𝑃𝑐) (3) 
 
Identification requires that there exists a covariate that affects the true sexual behavior but does 
not affect the probability of misclassification (Lewbel, 2000). We assume that the probability of 
misclassification depends on gender, age, marital status, education, religion and wealth only and 
that the excluded variables are the subjective beliefs. We estimate equation (3), a simple probit 
regression allowing for misreporting of sexual behavior in Table A4.
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 With misreporting and 
homogenous 𝑈− and 𝑐, the average marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢  is 0.146 (therefore slightly larger than 
the one reported in Table 5, suggesting that misreporting leads to a downward bias) and is 
statistically significant at 5% (column 1). When we allow 𝑈− to differ by gender and age 
(column 3), we also find that the marginal effects are of larger in magnitude than those of Table 
6.  
Columns (2) and (4) of Table A4 show that female, less educated and wealthier respondents are 
more likely to misreport their sexual behavior. Also, Indigenous Christian /African Independent 
Churches are more likely to misreport than Catholic. We compute the predicted probability of 
misreporting using coefficients from Column (4) and find that females are more likely to 
misreport than men: the median misreporting probability is 24.8% and 3.9% respectively.  
  
6.3.3. Non-sexually active respondents 
As explained in Section 5.1, we use the 2008 MLSFH respondents who have been 
sexually active in the 12 months prior to the survey for our analysis of risky sex. 13.1% of the 
2008 respondents who answered the 2006 expectations questions had no sex in the past 12 
months.
28
 We investigate in columns 3 and 4 of Table A3 the robustness of our results when we 
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 We estimate a simple probit rather than the whole system of equation (2). This is to simplify the estimation 
procedure and is motivated by the fact that the covariance between the random term 𝜀1 of the equation estimating 
the propensity to have multiple sex partners and the other equations is not statistically significantly different from 
zero in Table 5. 
28
 Of those, 34% are married, but we do not find any statistically significant difference in their subjective probability 
that their spouse is infected with HIV. This suggests that abstinence to avoid infection does not seem to be playing a 
critical role. Among those who have not had sex in the past 12 months, 52% are separated, divorced or widow and 
may therefore have other psychological consideration for abstinence beyond preventing HIV infection. Among the 
never married, 47% have never had sex and the decision of sexual activity initiation may be different from the one 
we focus on. 
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include non-sexually active respondents. We assume that their decision is between having zero 
partner and multiple partners. The subjective probability of becoming infected with HIV 
conditional on having zero partners is assumed to be zero for those respondents. All other 
subjective probabilities are defined as in Section 5.2. Again, results are very similar to those of 
Tables 5 and 6 (column 2). 
 
6.3.4. Attrition between 2006 and 2008 
As mentioned in Section 5.1, 23% of the 2006 respondents could not be resurveyed in 2008, 
so their behavior cannot be used to make inferences on 𝑈𝑖
− and 𝑐𝑖. We investigate whether the 
probability of attrition between 2006 and 2008 is associated with the relevant 2006 expectations 
and 2006 sexual behavior (Table A5). We find that past sexual behavior, expectations about 
transmission risk and survival expectations are not correlated with the probability of attrition. 
However, respondents who report a higher 2006 subjective probability of being infected with 
HIV are more likely to attrit. In order to evaluate whether this has an impact on our coefficients 
of interest, we augment the system of equation (2) with the following probit attrition equation: 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦0608𝑖
∗ = 𝛽5𝑥𝑖5 + 𝛾5𝑓𝑖
0 + 𝜀5                
                                   𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦0608𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦0608𝑖
∗ > 0                             (2.5) 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦0608𝑖 = 0 otherwise                                  
 
Where 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑦0608 = 1 if the respondent did not attrit between 2006 and 2008. Again, we allow 
𝜀5 to be correlated with the random terms 𝜀𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1,… ,4. Identification requires therefore at least 
one variable in 𝑥𝑖4 not included in 𝑥𝑖3, 𝑥𝑖2, 𝑥𝑖1 and 𝑥𝑖5. We will use the same exclusion 
restrictions as those discussed in Section 5.3. Equation (2.5) can be seen as a selection equation 
for the sexual behavior equation (2.1).  In order not to rely solely on functional form assumption, 
the selection equation (2.5) should have at least one variable that is not in the probit equation for 
having multiple sexual partner (2.1), i.e. we need a variable in 𝑥𝑖5 not in 𝑥𝑖1. We use the 2008 
month of the first attempted visit by the interviewers’ team as this exogenous variable. 
Interviews took place between May and August 2008. The team of interviewers is more likely to 
find a respondent in earlier than later during the field period. The reason is likely to be that May 
and June are harvest months so respondents tend to be close to their home. By August fewer 
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respondents are tending to crops and they may therefore be more likely to migrate temporarily.
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 We present the estimation results for all 5 equations in Table A6. Our main results are 
robust to the consideration of attrition: the marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢 is very similar to those of Table 
5 and precisely estimated. Moreover, the 2008 month of first attempted interview is a strong 
predictor of attrition. In addition, our excluded variables (having received a positive financial 
incentive and the belief of becoming infected with HIV in the next 12 months with normal sexual 
behavior) are still strong predictor of the 2006 pre-HIV test subjective probability of being 
currently infected with HIV. We obtain results similar to those of Table 6, column 2, if we allow 
𝑈− and c to vary by gender and age (not shown). 
 
6.3.5. Non-updating of subjective probability of being infected with HIV after testing 
Our model assumes that respondents who got tested for HIV in 2006 revise their beliefs fully 
based on the test result. There is however no conclusive empirical evidence on how people revise 
their beliefs just after obtaining their HIV test results. In Delavande and Kohler (2012), we find 
that only 10% of the respondents who were told they were HIV-positive in 2004 provided 10 
beans in response to the question about their subjective probability of being infected with HIV in 
2006 (see further discussion in footnote 16). If those who are told they are HIV-positive do not 
revise their beliefs upward to a probability of one, we may mistakenly exclude them for 
identifying the parameters 𝑈− and 𝑐. We may also wrongly assume that some respondents who 
tested negative revised their beliefs to a probability of zero. It is unclear how this may bias our 
results. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the system of equations (2) under the assumption 
that individuals do not revise at all their beliefs based on their HIV test results. Under the 
assumption that individuals’ posterior subjective probability of being infected with HIV is in the 
interval made by their prior probability and the actual test result (i.e., 𝑓𝑖
1
 belongs to [𝑓𝑖
0, 1] for 
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 The month of interview is correlated with the region but we control for region in all our regressions. One concern 
is whether this pattern is due to how remote the village where respondent live is, which could also influence sexual 
behavior.  In several sites, the interviewers start with the more remote villages and work their way closer to the main 
roads, from which people are more likely to migrate than the more rural areas. As a robustness check, we also 
included in equation (2.5) a variable equal to the difference between the date of the first attempted visit and the date 
of the beginning of fieldwork for that region. The coefficient of this time difference is negative and statistically 
significant at 5%. However, it does not change the month effects we find, nor the estimate of 𝑈− and 𝑐. 
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those who tested positive and [0, 𝑓𝑖
0] for those who tested negative), the “true” estimate for 𝑈− 
and 𝑐 will be between the bounds created by the estimates based on the full-updating assumption 
(table 5) and the ones based on the no-updating assumption (presented in table A3, column 5). 
Table A3 shows that, under the no-updating assumption, the marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢 is still 
precisely estimated, though slightly larger in magnitude. The resulting bounds for marginal effect 
of 𝑃𝑢 are tight and equal to [0.097, 0.115]. The marginal effect of 𝑃𝑐 is again statistically not 
significantly different from zero. We find similarly tight bounds if we allow 𝑈− and 𝑐 to vary by 
age and gender (Table A3, column 6). 
 
6.3.6. Potential endogeneity of transmission and survival expectations  
Equation (2.1) uses two beliefs as independent variables: 𝑃𝑢 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) −
𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) and 𝑃𝑐 = (1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
+. Our estimation strategy so far has dealt 
with the potential endogeneity of the subjective probability of being infected with HIV, 𝑓𝑖
1, 
arising from the dependence of current beliefs on past behaviors (lagged sexual behavior or HIV 
testing).  Another concern might be that unobservable characteristics also influence the relative 
subjective HIV transmission risks, 𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0),  as well as the decision to engage in risky sex. 
For example, the relative subjective HIV transmission risk, 𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0) depends on beliefs 
about the main partner’s HIV status and may also depend on other behaviors, such as condom 
use or frequency of intercourse, which may be related to unobservable characteristics that also 
influence the decision of having multiple partners. This concern is importantly mitigated by the 
fact that the subjective beliefs about the chance of becoming infected if married to someone is 
infected with HIV/AIDS or if having multiple partners in addition to spouses are asked about 
hypothetical individuals of the respondent’s age and gender (see Appendix B). Similarly, one 
could worry that unobservable characteristics also influence the subjective survival expectations, 
𝑆𝑖
+ and (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−), and the decision to have multiple sex partners. Again, this concern is 
mitigated by the fact that those expectations are asked about hypothetical individuals, (see 
Appendix B), though this could add measurement error. In order to address this potential 
influence of unobservable characteristics, we augment the system of equations (2) with the 
following two equations: 
𝑆𝑖
+ = 𝛽6𝑥𝑖6 + 𝜀𝑖6             (2.6) 
(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0)) = 𝛽7𝑥𝑖7 + 𝜀𝑖7  (2.7) 
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We continue to allow the random terms of all equations to be correlated.
30
 Similar to the 
earlier discussion, identification of the new system requires in addition one variable in 𝑥𝑖6  and 
𝑥𝑖7 not included 𝑥𝑖1. We use the subjective probability that a baby born in the respondents’ 
community will die within one year, which is likely to be influenced by the respondents’ 
perception of the burden of disease but should have no direct effect on the propensity to have 
multiple partners, as an excluded variable in the equation modeling elicited 10-year survival 
expectations conditional on being HIV-positive.
31
 We use as excluded variables in 𝑥𝑖8 whether 
the first attempted visit of the team of nurses in 2006 was within one week of the first attempted 
visit of the survey team in 2006, whether the first attempted spouse’s visit of the team of nurses 
in 2006 was within one week of the first attempted spouse’s visit of the survey team in 2006 and 
their interaction. Those create exogenous variation in the difference in transmission rates 
𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0) by influencing whether the respondent and his/her main partner have been tested 
for HIV in 2006, and therefore the respondent’s beliefs about own and the main partner’s HIV 
status. 
Table A7 reports a subset of the average marginal effects for all the equations of this 
augmented system. We note three important facts: (i) the marginal effect of 𝑃𝑢 is positive, 
statistically significant at 5% as before and of similar magnitude as in Table 5 while the marginal 
effect of 𝑃𝑐 is still imprecisely estimated; (ii) the variables from 𝑥𝑖6 and 𝑥𝑖7, excluded in 𝑥𝑖1 are 
statistically significant at at least 10%, (iii) none of the estimated correlation between 𝜀𝑖1 and the 
random terms of the remaining 6 equations is statistically significantly different from zero at 
conventional level. This is consistent again with the lack of endogeneity of the HIV-related 
expectations in this context.  
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 Note that this set-up does not address the potential endogeneity of the difference in survival expectation for 
someone healthy and someone infected with HIV, (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−). A main source of potential endogeneity is an 
unobserved trait 𝜂𝑖 that promotes health investment. A higher 𝜂𝑖 could be associated with a higher survival 
expectations and a lower propensity for risky sex. If this trait is additive and influences both survivals expectations 
in the same way, it cancels out in the when looking at the difference (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−). The fact that we do not find a 
statistically significant correlation between 𝜀𝑖6 and 𝜀𝑖1 in Table A7 suggests that the endogeneity of survival 
expectations is not an empirically important issue. 
31
 We do not find the child mortality expectations to be correlated with the propensity to have multiple partners. The 
average expectations is 2.45 for those who had one sexual partner and 2.89 for those who had multiple partners (P-
value for t-test of equality is 0.378). 
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7. Simulation of hypothetical policies 
Our results show that individuals consider their subjective beliefs about HIV status, 
transmission risk and survival when deciding to have multiple sexual partners. We now 
investigate how sexual behavior would change in response to various policy experiments that 
would change beliefs. Because we do not know how respondents would revise their beliefs when 
provided with new information, the simulation results can be seen as an upper bound of the 
behavioral change. Moreover, it is likely that the policies we envisioned, by changing behavior, 
would change transmission risk in the long run, and therefore perceived transmission risk as 
well. The counterfactuals we conduct do not take this possibility into consideration.  
The first two policies we consider are information campaigns. For those, we explore two 
alternative outcomes. First, we assume that the information campaign is fully successful at 
educating people who fully revise their beliefs by aligning them to the information provided 
(fully updated beliefs scenario). Second, we assume that individuals take into account both their 
prior beliefs and the information provided by the campaign to revise their beliefs, and that the 
resulting beliefs are a simple weighted average of the two (partially updated beliefs scenario).
32
  
We consider the four following policies: 
(i) Information campaign on mortality risk. We assume that individuals would be provided 
the life table estimates of males and females uninfected with HIV and of males and females 
infected with HIV. For example, for the fully updated belief scenario, we set the subjective 
probability of survival of a healthy individual equal to the appropriate probability from the UN 
life table estimates for Malawi without AIDS (United Nations, 2008), and we set the survival 
probability of an individual infected with HIV to those provided by Todd et al. (2007). Todd et 
al. (2007) measure survival since sero-conversion based on 4 East African population cohort 
studies before the availability of ART (two studies in Uganda, one in Tanzania, and one in 
Rwanda). See Table 4 for those mortality rates. 
(ii) Information campaign on transmission risk. We assume that individuals would be 
provided accurate information about transmission risk. For example, for the fully updated beliefs 
                                                 
32
 It is unclear how individuals would process this information. Delavande (2008b) shows that educated women in 
the U.S. exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their revision of beliefs when provided with statistical information. 
For simplification, we just therefore consider the weighted average.  
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scenario, we set the probability of becoming infected with HIV within one year if married to 
someone who is HIV-positive to 5.17% for men and 10.55% for women (Carpenter et al. 1999), 
and we set the probability of becoming infected within one year if one has multiple partners to 
0.38% for men and 2.08% for women, which is half the two-year sero-conversion rate that we 
observe in the MLSFH among respondents who had multiple sex partners and when pooling data 
from 2004, 2006 and 2008 (see Panel B of Table 4).
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 Finally, we also set the village prevalence 
equal to the MLSFH regional prevalence (this is relevant for respondents who did not report 
beliefs about a main partner’s HIV status). 
(iii) Extension of ART to all infected people. Respondents were asked the mortality risk for an 
individual who is sick with AIDS and an individual who is sick with AIDS and on ART.
34
 Panel 
A of Table 4 shows that, on average, people believe that being on ART will give an individual 
sick with AIDS the same odd of survival as someone infected with HIV. For our simulation, we 
would like to know respondents’ belief about the survival for an individual infected with HIV 
and on ART, a belief we did not elicit. We assume that respondents believe that ART will be as 
protective, in relative term, for an HIV-positive individual as for someone infected with AIDS, 
i.e., 
𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑉
𝐴𝑅𝑇
𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑉
𝑁𝑂 𝐴𝑅𝑇 =
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑆
𝐴𝑅𝑇
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑆
𝑁𝑂 𝐴𝑅𝑇, where 𝑆ℎ
𝑎 is the survival of an individual infected with ℎ, {ℎ =
𝐻𝐼𝑉, 𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑆}, and with treatment status 𝑡, {𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑇,𝑁𝑂 𝐴𝑅𝑇}. Under this assumption, the 
average 10 year probability of survival for someone infected with HIV and on ART is 20.25% 
(compared to an average of 11.78% for someone infected with HIV and of 40.95% for someone 
healthy). For this policy experiment, we therefore replace the survival probability of an 
individual infected with HIV with the individual-specific subjective survival probability for an 
individual infected with HIV who is on ART. We focus on the effect of such a campaign on 
individuals who know they are HIV-negative or who have not been tested for HIV.  
(iv) Extension of ART to all infected people and information of the effect of ART on 
transmission risk. Cohen et al. (2013) report that being on ART reduces the transmission risky 
by 96%. We now assume that respondents’ beliefs about survival are like in point (iii) and 
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 We assume that HIV incidence was the same among those who refused to get tested and those who agreed.  
34
 While ART is now becoming more prevalent in Malawi, it was essentially not available in the MLSFH study 
regions until shortly before the 2008 MLSFH survey. 
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further assume that respondents are aware that being on ART reduces transmission risk by 96%, 
i.e. following the notation of Section 5.2, we replace for each respondent the subjective 
probability of infection associated with having multiple partners 𝑝𝑖(1) by 0.04𝑝𝑖(1) and the 
perceived probability of becoming infected with HIV during the next 12 months for someone 
who is married to an HIV-positive individual Π𝑖 by 0.04Π𝑖. This dramatically reduces the 
difference in transmission risk between having multiple partners versus one partner (𝑝𝑖(1) −
𝑝𝑖(0)), which now becomes 0.028 on average (compared to a baseline average of 0.691).  
We compute the predicted probabilities of having multiple sex partners using the second 
column of Table 6, in which 𝑈− and 𝑐 vary by gender and age. Table 7 shows the mean and the 
25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of the predicted probabilities of having multiple partners, along 
with the proportion of individuals for whom the predicted probability increases, decreases or 
remain the same, for all the policy scenarios. 
An information campaign on mortality that would lead to full revision of beliefs would be 
beneficial and decrease the average predicted probability of having multiple partners from 
21.94% to 15.55% for men and from 2.59% to 2.17% for women. Respondents are very 
pessimistic regarding their survival conditional on being healthy and conditional on being 
infected with HIV, compared with available statistics (see Table 4). Note however that the 
difference in perceived survival probabilities with and without HIV infection (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) is key to 
decision-making. Despite being pessimistic regarding their survival rates, respondents on 
average underestimate the impact of HIV on survival. The average (𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) based on 
subjective beliefs is -0.29 in the sample (see figure 2 for the whole distribution), compared to an 
average of -0.47 based on available statistics. This is why providing information on mortality 
risk reduces risky sexual behavior on average. When looking at distributional impact, Table 7 
shows overwhelmingly positive impact for men: 93% would reduce their risky behavior 
following this information campaign, while only 3% would increase it. About 4% would not 
change their behavior: those with inelastic behavior to information on mortality risk are 
individuals who believe/know they are HIV-positive or those for whom the difference in 
transmission risk is zero. For women, 63% (30%) would reduce (increase) their risky sexual 
behavior. 
The effect would still be beneficial, though smaller, if individuals only partially update 
beliefs in light of the new information. Under the assumption that revised beliefs would be the 
 37 
weighted average of prior beliefs and the provided information, the average predicted probability 
of having multiple partners would decrease to 18.40% for men and to 2.29% for women.  
Table 7 shows that an information campaign on transmission risk would actually have an 
undesirable effect: the average predicted probability of having multiple partners would actually 
increase to 26.93% for men and 3.75% for women under this policy and the fully updated beliefs 
scenario. This is because respondents over-estimate the relative impact that having multiple 
partners has on the probability of becoming infected with HIV. Respondents are overall very 
pessimistic regarding HIV transmission risks. While the yearly incidence in sero-discordant 
couples is estimated to be 5.17% for men and 10.55% for women (Carpenter et al., 1999), the 
average subjective probability of becoming infected with HIV conditional on being married to an 
HIV-positive spouse is 93.9% for men and 92.2% for women (Panel B of Table 4). Similarly, 
while the probability of becoming infected within 1 year if one has multiple partners is 0.38% for 
males and 2.08% for females in the MLSFH, the average subjective probabilities are 76.3% and 
78.2% respectively. What matters for decision-making is the relative subjective risk of becoming 
infected under these conditions, i.e., 𝑝𝑖(1) − Π𝑖 × 𝑓𝑝𝑖
1
.  
This average subjective difference in risk is 0.709 for men and 0.680 for women. If we use 
statistics from existing studies (but still use the beliefs about the partner’s HIV status ), the 
difference in risk is much smaller: 0.004 for men and 0.100 for women. This explains why 
providing information on transmission risk actually increases risky behavior on average. Under 
this scenario, most of the men (89%) and women (69%) would have a higher probability of 
having multiple partners. Under the partially update beliefs scenario, risky behavior would also 
increase, though less than under the fully updated beliefs scenario.
35
 
Finally, we consider the effect on sexual behavior of extending ART to all infected 
people. As the survey shows, people are aware that being on ART decreases the “cost” of 
becoming infected with HIV by increasing survival probability. As a result, we find an increase 
in risky behavior on average, though the effect is rather small, when taking into consideration 
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 In order to evaluate how elastic the sexual behavior is to change in beliefs, we also compute the average predicted 
probabilities of having multiple partners in the “best case scenario” regarding the beliefs, i.e. under the assumption 
that the probability of being infected is zero, difference in transmission risk is one, the probability of survival 
conditional on being healthy is one and conditional on being HIV+ is zero. The average predicted probability is 
13.71% for men and 1.14% for women, substantially lower than under the current beliefs. 
1
pif
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only how the roll-out of ART would influence mortality risk. Excluding individuals who know 
they are HIV-positive, the average predicted probability of having multiple partners increases 
slightly from 22.02% to 22.05% for men and from 2.43% to 3.27% for women. The small 
magnitude is due to the heterogeneous effect of such a policy. More than half of the respondents 
would not change their behavior because they do not see an improvement in 10-year survival by 
being on ART. Yet, about a quarter of respondents (22% of men and 28% of women) would 
have a higher predicted probability of having multiple partners. However, we also find that, if 
people become aware in addition that being on ART would dramatically reduce HIV 
transmission risk, risky behavior would increase more substantially. The average predicted 
probability of having multiple partners increases to 26.92% for men and to 3.67% for women. In 
addition, we find that 91% of the men and 73% of the women would increase the probability of 
having multiple partners. 
 
Conclusion 
Behavioral changes related to the transmission of HIV are likely to depend on the 
information and knowledge of individuals, in particular their expectations about their HIV status 
and that of their partners, survival risks, and transmission risks associated with behaviors such as 
having multiple sexual partners or not using condoms. Yet, little is known about health-related 
subjective expectations in high-HIV-prevalence environments and how they influence decision-
making related to the spread of the disease. In this paper, we fill this knowledge gap by using 
rich data on probabilistic beliefs elicited directly from rural Malawi survey respondents to 
investigate the role of HIV/AIDS-related expectations on the decision to engage in risky sex. We 
deal with the potential endogeneity of expectations by estimating a system of equations. We find 
that the difference in probability of survival associated with having multiple partners versus 
having one partner, which in turn depends on a large set of expectations all observed in our data, 
plays an important role in the decision to have multiple sexual partners. Moreover, our results 
suggest that the threat of reduced survival associated with HIV, rather than the threat of living 
with HIV, influences sexual behavior in the SSA context. 
Using our estimated preference parameters, we simulate the impact of policies that would 
influence expectations. Our results suggest that information campaigns focused on disease 
transmission are likely to have limited impact on behavior. Actually, providing information on 
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transmission risk may have a perverse effect and increase the likelihood of risky sex. Rather, we 
suggest a new focus for information campaign that would decrease the prevalence of risky 
behavior:  survival rates for healthy and infected individuals or on relative survival rates.  
We also find that the expansion of ART to all individuals infected with HIV would 
increase risky sexual behavior for a quarter of the HIV-negative respondents (or those who have 
not been tested). The effect would be much larger if people also become aware that ART reduces 
transmission risk dramatically. This suggests that expansion of ART should not be done in 
isolation, but rather combined with behavioral interventions to mitigate the effects of the roll-out 
of ART on HIV-negative individuals. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of data collection  
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Figure 2: Distribution (in %) of the subjective probability of being infected with HIV, by HIV 
status (HIV test done after elicitation of probabilities) 
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Figure 3: Distribution (in %) of beliefs by number of sexual partners 
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Probability of becoming infected if sex with multiple partners minus Probability of becoming 
infected if sex with one partner 
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Table 1: Characteristics of 2006 respondents and 2008 respondents who answered the 2006 
probabilistic expectations  
  2006 2008 
N 3081 2230 
   Female 57.7 60.5 
   Age 
  less than 29 44.1 32.7 
30 to 39 22.6 26.3 
40 to 49 17.8 22.0 
50+ 14.9 19.1 
Missing 0.6 0.0 
   Education 
  No School 20.8 23.2 
Primary level 64.8 64.3 
Secondary level + 13.8 12.5 
Missing 0.7 0.0 
   married/living together 80.0 86.7 
   Religion 
  Catholic 17.3 16.5 
Muslim 24.6 24.5 
Indigenous Christian /African Independent 
Churches 
14.9 13.6 
Other Christian 36.8 33.4 
Other religions 5.7 8.4 
No religion 0.5 0.9 
Missing 0.8 4.0 
   Land ownership 
  2 acres of less 43.2 40.6 
Between 2 acres and 4 acres 32.1 31.2 
More than 4 acres 23.7 24.6 
Missing 1.1 3.6 
   Region 
  Central region 32.5 31.5 
Southern region 35.2 36.2 
Northern region 32.3 32.2 
   Number of sex partners in past 12 
months 
  0 14.9 13.1 
1 77.0 78.2 
2 or more 8.2 8.7 
   
 48 
HIV test results  
  Negative 74.7 74.0 
Positive 4.0 3.7 
Indeterminate 0.2 0.0 
Refuse test 6.8 5.8 
Not found on day of test 14.3 16.5 
 
  
   2004 HIV testing experiment 
  Received a positive financial incentive 
(amont participants) 74.9 75.6 
Financial incentive among participants (in 
Kwacha) 
102.2 103.2 
Did not participate in the 2004 HIV test 32.5 29.1 
 
  
Probability of becoming infected with HIV 
within the next 12 months with normal 
sexual behavior for someone healthy and 
same gender and village as respondent 
0.2 0.3 
 
  
First attempted visit of the 2006 team of 
nurses is within one week of the first 
attempted visit of the survey team 
13.4 
 
 
  
 Month of first attempted 2008 
interview   
May 
 
13.6 
June 
 
22.6 
July 
 
32.9 
August   22.7 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables: mean and standard deviation in 
parenthesis 
 
  All Males Females 
2006 pre-test probability of being currently infected 
with HIV 
0.11 0.08 0.14 
 
(0.20) (0.17) (0.22) 
    
Found by team of nurses conducting HIV test in 2006 85.96 84.24 87.23 
    
Learned HIV status in 2006 conditional on being 
found 
90.33 89.80 90.67 
    
Had multiple partners in the last 12 month in 2008 
conditional on being sexually active in 2008 and 
having non-missing beliefs 
13.00 22.20 2.08 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of subjective probabilities for respondents who were sexually 
active in the past 12 months in 2008 
 
  
Notation in 
model from 
Section 2 Mean SD 
Subjective probability (from 0 to 1) that: 
   
Respondent is currently infected with HIV (post 
2006 HIV test) 
𝑓𝑖
1
 0.046 0.188 
Someone of respondent's age and gender who is 
currently healthy will survive within 10 years 
𝑆𝑖
− 0.409 0.219 
Someone of respondent's age and gender who is 
currently infected with HIV will survive within 10 
years 
𝑆𝑖
+ 0.118 0.162 
Someone healthy of respondent's gender become 
infected with HIV in the next 12 months if several 
sexual partners in addition to her spouse 
𝑝𝑖(1) 0.774 0.194 
Someone healthy of respondent's gender become 
infected with HIV in the next 12 months if married 
to someone who is infected with HIV/AIDS 
Π𝑖 0.930 0.139 
Spouse/romantic partner is currently infected with 
HIV status  (post 2006 HIV test) 
𝑓𝑝𝑖
1
 0.078 0.183 
One becomes infected with HIV in the next 12 
months if having sex with spouse only 
𝑝𝑖(0) = Π𝑖 × 𝑓𝑝𝑖
1
 0.082 0.180 
 
 
Beliefs relevant for decision to have multiple 
partners 
   
(1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))(𝑆𝑖
+ − 𝑆𝑖
−) -0.196 0.167 
 
(1 − 𝑓𝑖
1)(𝑝𝑖(1) − 𝑝𝑖(0))𝑆𝑖
+ 
 
0.076 
 
0.118 
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Table 4: Average probabilities in 2006 among respondents who were sexually active in 2008, 
with standard deviations in parentheses 
Panel A 
Subjective probability that hypothetical individual will 
be alive in 10 years by age group 
  Ten-year survival rates 
 
  
Someone 
your age 
healthy 
Someone 
your age 
sick 
infected 
with HIV 
Someone 
your age 
sick with 
AIDS 
Someone 
your age 
sick with 
AIDS and 
treated 
with ART 
  
Malawi life 
tables (no 
AIDS 
scenario) † 
Since year 
of sero-
conversion 
observed 
in East 
Africa 
cohort 
population 
†† 
 <29 0.443 0.125 0.008 0.109 
 
0.980 0.607 
 
 
(0.219) (0.172) (0.040) (0.150) 
 
   30-39 0.400 0.124 0.006 0.110 
 
0.962 0.429 
 
 
(0.217) (0.159) (0.028) (0.151) 
 
   40-49 0.393 0.105 0.004 0.094 
 
0.898 0.279 
 
 
(0.211) (0.150) (0.028) (0.137) 
 
   50+ 0.349 0.102 0.011 0.113 
 
0.682 0.175 
   (0.349) (0.150) (0.060) (0.164)       
 F-test***  0.000 0.089 0.216 0.349 
 
   
Panel B 
Subjective probability of becoming 
infected in the next 12 months by 2006 
HIV status and gender 
    One-year transmission risk  
  
If several 
sexual 
partners in 
addition to 
spouse 
If married 
to 
someone 
who is 
infected 
with 
HIV/AIDS  
If has sex 
with main 
partner 
only 
  
 
If several 
sexual 
partners in 
addition to 
spouse* 
If married 
to 
someone 
who is 
infected 
with 
HIV/AIDS** 
If has 
sex with 
one 
partner 
only* 
Male 
    
  0.004 0.052 0.003 
HIV- 0.769 0.938 0.051 
  
   
 
(0.197) (0.129) (0.135) 
  
   HIV+ 0.764 0.971 0.133 
  
   
 
(0.210) (0.073) (0.281) 
  
   Not tested 0.739 0.938 0.058 
  
   
 
(0.217) (0.171) (0.175) 
  
   F-test  0.273 0.674 0.120           
 
    
  
   Female 
     
0.021 0.106 0.006 
HIV- 0.783 0.924 0.093 
   
  
 
(0.189) (0.138) (0.180) 
   
  HIV+ 0.757 0.886 0.246 
   
  
 
(0.174) (0.165) (0.345) 
   
  Not tested 0.787 0.922 0.110 
   
  
 
(0.187) (0.132) (0.210) 
   
  F-test***  0.641 0.209 0.000           
† 
Source: United Nations (2008); 
†† 
Source: Todd et al. (2007) based on 4 East African Population cohorts; * Source: 
2004, 2006 and 2008 MLSFH data; ** Source: Carpenter et al. (1999); *** P-value for F-test of equality of means 
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Table 5: The impact of subjective beliefs on sexual behavior (average marginal effects) 
  
Had multiple 
partners in the 
last 12 month 
in 2008 
conditional on 
being sexually 
active 
Found by 
team of 
nurses 
conducting 
HIV test in 
2006 
Learned HIV 
status in 2006 
conditional on 
being found 
2006 pre-test 
probability of 
being 
currently 
infected with 
HIV 
𝑃𝑢 0.097**     
 
[0.042]    
   
𝑃𝑐  -0.068    
 
[0.074]    
   
Female -0.149*** 0.010 0.009 0.089**  
 
[0.019]    [0.016] [0.012] [0.030]    
Had no partner in the last 12 months in 
2006     
Had 1 partner  in the last 12 months in 2006 0.033 0.003 0.033 0.009 
 
[0.038]    [0.023] [0.021] [0.048]    
Had multiple partners  in the last 12 months 
in 2006 0.171*** -0.047 0.049* 0.179*** 
 
[0.040]    [0.031] [0.028] [0.062]    
Less than 29 years old  
    
30-39 0.017 0.099*** 0.004 0.037 
 
[0.020]    [0.019] [0.016] [0.032]    
40-49 0.002 0.088*** 0.010 -0.008 
 
[0.021]    [0.021] [0.019] [0.041]    
50+ -0.011 0.085*** -0.006 -0.029 
 
[0.021]    [0.021] [0.019] [0.045]    
No school in 2008 
    
Primary school 0.018 -0.016 0.011 -0.044 
 
[0.020]    [0.019] [0.015] [0.032]    
Secondary school or more 0.038 -0.016 -0.026 0.008 
 
[0.029]    [0.029] [0.025] [0.054]    
Married  -0.099*** -0.055** -0.038** 0.032 
 
[0.023]    [0.020] [0.019] [0.038]    
Catholic 
    
Muslim 0.038 0.002 -0.012 -0.054 
 
[0.026]    [0.024] [0.023] [0.040]    
Indigenous Christian /African Independent 
Churches 0.029 -0.013 0.018 0.001 
 
[0.027]    [0.024] [0.022] [0.049]    
Other Christian -0.054**  0.021 0.006 -0.044 
 
[0.022]    [0.020] [0.017] [0.040]    
Other or missing or no religions -0.027 -0.013 0.073** -0.098 
 
[0.033]    [0.032] [0.037] [0.062]    
Own 2 acres or less of land 
    
Between 2 and 4 acres 0.020 -0.016 -0.005 -0.012 
 
[0.017]    [0.016] [0.015] [0.030]    
More than 4 acres 0.008 -0.033* -0.021 -0.025 
 
[0.019]    [0.018] [0.016] [0.035]    
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Continuation of Table 5 
 
  
 
2006 pre-test probability of being currently 
infected with HIV  0.152*** -0.062  
 
 
[0.054] [0.044] 
 
First attempted visit of the 2006 team of 
nurses is within one week of the first 
attempted visit of the survey team 
 
0.068*** 
  
 
 
[0.020] 
  
Receive positive financial incentive in 2004 
testing experiment   0.032* 0.083**  
 
  
[0.018] [0.042]    
Did not participate in 2004 testing 
experiment   -0.053*** 0.021 
 
  
[0.018] [0.047]    
Probability that someone healthy of 
respondent's gender become infected with 
HIV in the next 12 months  with normal 
sexual behavior 
   
0.129*   
    
[0.068]    
        
 r_44 0.271*** 
 
[0.020] 
r_12 -0.009 
 
[0.087] 
r_13 -0.004 
 
[0.101] 
r_14 -0.011 
 
[0.129] 
r_23 -0.442* 
 
[0.246] 
r_24 -0.421** 
 
[0.128] 
r_34 0.206* 
 
[0.111] 
N 2,576 
Table shows marginal effects. In column 4, we report the coefficients, i.e. the marginal effect for𝑓𝑖
0∗. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include regions dummies and a missing indicator for age, education and land ownership. 
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Table 6: The impact of subjective beliefs on sexual behavior: heterogeneity in preferences 
(Dependent variable is “Had multiple partners in the last 12 month in 2008 conditional on being 
sexually active”) (Average marginal effects) 
  
Gender 
Gender and 
age 
Gender and 
wealth 
𝑃𝑢 - female 0.176*   
 
[0.107] 
  
𝑃𝑢 - male 0.090*   
 
[0.046] 
  
𝑃𝑐  - female 0.024   
 
[0.111] 
  
𝑃𝑐  - male -0.106   
 
[0.085] 
  
𝑃𝑢 - female less than 29 years old 
 
0.317**  
  
[0.128] 
 
𝑃𝑢 - female more than 30 years old 
 
-0.007  
  
[0.166] 
 
𝑃𝑢 - male less than 29 years old 
 
0.019  
  
[0.059] 
 
𝑃𝑢 - male more than 30 years old 
 
0.217***  
  
[0.073] 
 
𝑃𝑐  - female less than 29 years old 
 
0.070  
  
[0.127] 
 
𝑃𝑐  - female more than 30 years old 
 
-0.105  
  
[0.205] 
 
𝑃𝑐  - male less than 29 years old 
 
-0.098  
  
[0.102] 
 
𝑃𝑐  - male more than 30 years old 
 
-0.105  
  
[0.139] 
 
𝑃𝑢 - female and low wealth 
 
 0.126 
  
 
[0.156]    
𝑃𝑢 - female and high wealth 
 
 0.271*   
  
 
[0.141]    
𝑃𝑢 - male and low wealth 
 
 0.086 
  
 
[0.070]    
𝑃𝑢 - male and high wealth 
  
0.092 
   
[0.058]    
𝑃𝑐  - female and low wealth 
  
-0.242 
   
[0.174]    
𝑃𝑐  - female and high wealth 
 
 0.168 
   
[0.128]    
𝑃𝑐  - male and low wealth 
  
-0.056 
   
[0.130]    
𝑃𝑐  - male and high wealth 
  
-0.135 
  
  
[0.106]    
P-value for test of equality of U- 0.464 0.055 0.673 
P-value for test of equality of -c 0.344 0.726 0.175 
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Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. See all remaining coefficients in Appendix table A2. 
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Table 7: Impact of policies on the predicted probabilities of having multiple partners 
  Predicted probabilities 
  All sample   Fully updated beliefs   Partially updated beliefs 
stats Baseline    
Mortality 
risk 
information 
Transmission 
risk 
information 
  
Mortality 
risk 
information 
Transmission 
risk 
information 
Males 
    
  
 25th perc. 0.0942  
0.0490 0.1398 
 
0.0700 0.1149 
Median 0.1622  
0.0962 0.2173 
 
0.1215 0.1829 
75th perc. 0.2747  
0.2041 0.3294 
 
0.2333 0.2901 
mean 0.2194   0.1555 0.2693   0.1840 0.2419 
Percentage with reduced risk   
93.32 1.09 
 
93.32 1.36 
Percentage with same risk   
3.54 9.69 
 
3.54 9.69 
Percentage with increased risk   
3.13 89.22 
 
3.13 88.95 
Females               
25th perc. 0.0070  
0.0057 0.0147 
 
0.0063 0.0114 
Median 0.0160  
0.0122 0.0273 
 
0.0136 0.0229 
75th perc. 0.0321  
0.0248 0.0460 
 
0.0267 0.0477 
mean 0.0259   0.0217 0.0375   0.0229 0.0565 
Percentage with reduced risk   
63.36 17.38 
 
63.36 17.86 
Percentage with same risk   
6.20 13.94 
 
6.2 13.94 
Percentage with increased risk   
30.44 68.67 
 
30.44 68.19 
                
Excludes respondents who know they are HIV+ 
   
stats Baseline    
Roll-out of 
ART  
Roll-out of 
ART and 
reduced 
transm. risk 
   Males 
       25th perc. 0.0934  0.0973 0.1397 
   Median 0.1618  0.1628 0.2161 
   75th perc. 0.2774  0.2771 0.3339 
   mean 0.2202   0.2205 0.2692 
   Percentage with reduced risk 
  
25.42 1.55 
   Percentage with same risk 
  
52.68 7.63 
   Percentage with increased risk     21.89 90.82 
   Females       
 
   25th perc. 0.0067  0.0074 0.0145 
   Median 0.0151  0.0176 0.0263 
   75th perc. 0.0299  0.0389 0.0449 
   mean 0.0243   0.0327 0.0367 
   Percentage with reduced risk 
  
16.54 18.12 
   Percentage with same risk 
  
54.97 8.9 
   Percentage with increased risk     28.48 72.98 
   Reduced (same/increased) risk means strictly smaller (same/strictly larger) predicted probability compared to 
baseline. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Estimation of the system of equations (2) with fixed residual correlation (Average 
marginal effects) 
 
  𝜌14=-0.5 𝜌14=-0.3 𝜌14=-0.1 𝜌14=0.1 𝜌14=0.3 𝜌14=0.5 
       𝑃𝑢 0.158*** 0.130*** 0.107** 0.089** 0.074* 0.063 
 
[0.048] [0.045] [0.043] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
𝑃𝑐  -0.132 -0.102 -0.078 -0.059 -0.045 -0.035 
  [0.081] [0.078] [0.075] [0.074] [0.072] [0.071] 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Estimates based on system of equations (2) and same controls as in Table 5.  
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Table A2: The impact of subjective beliefs on sexual behavior: heterogeneity in preferences – 
other coefficients for results presented in table 6 (Dependent variable is “Had multiple partners 
in the last 12 month in 2008 conditional on being sexually active”) (Average marginal effects) 
 
 
Gender 
Gender and 
age 
Gender and 
wealth 
Female -0.072 -0.045 -0.070 
 
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073]    
Had no partner in the last 12 months in 
2006    
Had 1 partner  in the last 12 months in 
2006 0.071 0.072 0.069 
 
[0.047] [0.046] [0.047]    
Had multiple partners  in the last 12 
months in 2006 0.210*** 0.211*** 0.207*** 
 
[0.049] [0.047] [0.048]    
Had 1 partner  in the last 12 months in 
2006 x female -0.094 -0.094 -0.096 
 
[0.069] [0.068] [0.068]    
Had multiple partners  in the last 12 
months in 2006 x female -0.134 -0.13 -0.137 
 
[0.104] [0.103] [0.105]    
Less than 29 years old in 2008 
   
30-39 0.022 0.024 0.023 
 
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024]    
40-49 0.002 0.042 0.003 
 
[0.023] [0.033] [0.023]    
50+ -0.01 0.027 -0.011 
 
[0.023] [0.032] [0.023]    
30-39 x female -0.015 -0.019 -0.016 
 
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043]    
40-49 x female 0.005 -0.070 0.008 
 
[0.040] [0.062] [0.040]    
No school in 2008 
   
Primary school 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020]    
Secondary school or more 0.039 0.037 0.038 
 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029]    
Married in 2008 -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.106*** 
 
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027]    
Married in 2008 x female 0.023 0.028 0.026 
 
[0.053] [0.053] [0.053]    
Catholic 
   
Muslim 0.037 0.035 0.039 
 
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026]    
Indigenous Christian /African Independent 
Churches 0.029 0.028 0.029 
 
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027]    
Other Christian -0.054** -0.056** -0.054**  
 
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022]    
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Continuation of Table A2    
Other or missing or no religions -0.027 -0.031 -0.026 
 
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033]    
Own 2 acres or less of land 
   
Between 2 and 4 acres 0.019 0.020 0.023 
 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.025]    
More than 4 acres 0.006 0.008 0.009 
 
[0.019] [0.019] [0.026]    
N 2,576 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include regions dummies and a missing indicator for age, education and land 
ownership. Estimation based on system of equations (2). 
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Table A3: The impact of subjective beliefs on sexual behavior: robustness checks (Dependent 
variable is “Had multiple partners in the last 12 month in 2008 conditional on being sexually 
active”) (Average marginal effects) 
 
  
HIV testing 
between 2006 
and 2008 
Pooling sexually 
active and non-
sexually active 
respondents 
Non-updating of 
subjective 
probability of being 
infected 
𝑃𝑢 0.092** 
 
0.096*** 
 
0.115*** 
 
 
[0.042] 
 
[0.036] 
 
[0.043] 
 𝑃𝑐  -0.063 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.084 
 
 
[0.073] 
 
[0.063] 
 
[0.074] 
 𝑃𝑢 - female less than 29 years old 
 
0.298** 
 
0.274*** 
 
0.280** 
  
[0.121] 
 
[0.106]    
 
[0.126]    
𝑃𝑢 - female more than 30 years old 
 
-0.013 
 
0.002 
 
0.084 
  
[0.163]    
 
[0.135]    
 
[0.148]    
𝑃𝑢 - male less than 29 years old 
 
0.011 
 
0.035 
 
0.057 
  
[0.059]    
 
[0.049]    
 
[0.058]    
𝑃𝑢 - male more than 30 years old 
 
0.216***  
 
0.192***  
 
0.205*** 
  
[0.073]    
 
[0.063]    
 
[0.071]    
𝑃𝑐  - female less than 29 years old 
 
0.071 
 
0.084 
 
0.086 
  
[0.125]    
 
[0.109]    
 
[0.124]    
𝑃𝑐  - female more than 30 years old 
 
-0.098 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.190 
  
[0.203]    
 
[0.166]    
 
[0.196]    
𝑃𝑐  - male less than 29 years old 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.126 
  
[0.105]    
 
[0.084]    
 
[0.101]    
𝑃𝑐  - male more than 30 years old 
 
-0.100 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.099 
  
[0.139]    
 
[0.121]  
 
[0.137]    
Total number of observations used in system 
of equations (2) 
2576 2573 2581 2581 2571 2571 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Estimates based on system of equations (2). Regressions in columns 1,3 and 5 include same 
controls as in Table 5. Regressions in columns 2,4 and 6 include same controls as in Tables 6 and A2. 
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Table A4: The impact of subjective beliefs on sexual behavior: allowing for misreporting of 
sexual behavior (Average marginal effects) 
 
 Homogenous U and c 
Heterogeneity by gender 
and age 
 
Had 
multiple 
partners in 
the last 12 
month in 
2008 
conditional 
on being 
sexually 
active 
Misreporting 
Had 
multiple 
partners in 
the last 12 
month in 
2008 
conditional 
on being 
sexually 
active 
Misreporting 
𝑃𝑢 0.146**    
 
[0.066] 
   
𝑃𝑐  -0.149    
 
[0.123] 
   
𝑃𝑢 - female less than 29 years old 
  
0.670**   
   
[0.294]    
 
𝑃𝑢 - female more than 30 years old 
  
-0.085  
   
[0.252]    
 
𝑃𝑢 - male less than 29 years old 
  
-0.027  
   
[0.124]    
 
𝑃𝑢 - male more than 30 years old 
  
0.391***  
   
[0.125]    
 
𝑃𝑐  - female less than 29 years old 
  
0.078  
   
[0.218]    
 
𝑃𝑐  - female more than 30 years old 
  
-0.231 
 
   
[0.352]    
 𝑃𝑐  - male less than 29 years old 
  
-0.171  
   
[0.161]    
 
𝑃𝑐  - male more than 30 years old 
  
-0.276  
   
[0.235]    
 
Female -0.177*** 0.164** 0.086 0.193*** 
 
[0.042] [0.074] [0.165]    [0.069]    
Had no partner in the last 12 months in 
2006 
   
 
Had 1 partner  in the last 12 months in 2006 0.073 
 
0.151* 
 
 
[0.073] 
 
[0.082]    
 
Had multiple partners  in the last 12 months 
in 2006 0.288*** 
 
0.385***  
 
[0.095] 
 
[0.102]    
 
Had 1 partner  in the last 12 months in 2006 
x female 
  
-0.164  
   
[0.113]    
 Had multiple partners  in the last 12 months 
in 2006 x female 
  
-0.215 
 
   
[0.161]    
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Continuation of Table A4     
Less than 29 years old 
 
   30-39 0.043 0.022 0.046 -0.027 
 
[0.047] [0.124] [0.049]    [0.090]    
40-49 -0.059 -0.146 0.009 -0.180*   
 
[0.069] [0.096] [0.065]    [0.093]    
50+ -0.048 -0.059 0.019 -0.101 
 
[0.054] [0.099] [0.058]    [0.083]    
30-39 x female 
  
-0.054 
 
   
[0.081]    
 40+ x female 
  
-0.175 
 
   
[0.118]    
 No school 
  
  Primary school -0.141* -0.357*** -0.160*   -0.365*** 
 
[0.081] [0.135] [0.089]    [0.096]    
Secondary school or more -0.091 -0.242** -0.125 -0.275**  
 
[0.796] [0.123] [0.095]    [0.111]    
Married  -0.283*** -0.180 -0.290*** -0.141 
 
[0.049] [0.177] [0.052]    [0.128]    
Married x female 
  
0.006 
 
   
[0.104]    
 Catholic 
 
   Muslim -0.052 -0.226 -0.059 -0.226 
 
[0.082] [0.147] [0.086]    [0.141]    
Indigenous Christian /African Independent 
Churches 0.216** 0.474*** 0.248*** 0.475***  
 
[0.104] [0.180] [0.094]    [0.170]    
Other Christian -0.065* 0.121 -0.071*   0.105 
 
[0.039] [0.098] [0.041]    [0.095]    
Other or missing or no religions -0.064 -0.021 -0.081 -0.066 
 
[0.052] [0.119] [0.057]    [0.147]    
Own 2 acres or less of land 
   
 
Between 2 and 4 acres 0.126* 0.219*** 0.155*** 0.242***  
 
[0.065] 0.084 [0.060]    [0.086]    
More than 4 acres 0.091* 0.212* 0.110**  0.221**  
 
[0.049] [0.116] [0.049]    [0.112]    
N 1386 
Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include regions dummies and a missing indicator for age, education and land 
ownership. 
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Table A5: Probability of being re-interviewed in 2008 (probit specification – Average marginal 
effects) 
 
 
Re-
interviewed in 
2008 
2006 pre-test probability of being currently infected 
with HIV -0.106*** 
 [0.039]    
Probability of being alive in 10 years if healthy 
-0.022 
 
[0.043]    
Probability of being alive in 10 years if infected with 
HIV 0.075 
 
[0.060]    
Probability that someone healthy of respondent's 
gender become infected with HIV in the next 12 
months  if several sexual partners in addition to  
spouse -0.036 
 
[0.042]    
Probability that someone healthy of respondent's 
gender become infected with HIV in the next 12 
months if married to someone who is infected with 
HIV/AIDS -0.006 
 
[0.064]    
Female 0.028*   
 
[0.017]    
Had no partner in the last 12 months in 2006 
 
Had 1 partner  in the last 12 months in 2006 0.020 
 
[0.027]    
Had multiple partners  in the last 12 months in 2006 -0.001 
 
[0.038]    
Less than 29 years old in 2008 
 
30-39 0.048**  
 
[0.022]    
40-49 0.071***  
 
[0.025]    
50+ 0.050*   
 
[0.027]    
No school in 2008 
 
Primary school -0.029 
 
[0.023]    
Secondary school or more -0.056*   
 
[0.034]    
Married in 2008 0.055**  
 
[0.024]    
Catholic 
 
Muslim -0.023 
 
[0.035]    
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Continuation of Table A5 
 
Indigenous Christian /African Independent 
Churches -0.024 
 
[0.031]    
Other Christian -0.018 
 
[0.025]    
Other or missing or no religions 0.013 
 
[0.041]    
Own 2 acres or less of land 
 
Between 2 and 4 acres 0.023 
 
[0.020]    
More than 4 acres 0.018 
 
[0.023]    
N 2403 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Regression includes regions dummies and a missing indicator for age, education and land 
ownership. 
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Table A6: The impact of subjective beliefs on sexual behavior taking into account attrition 
(Average marginal effects) 
  
Had 
multiple 
partners in 
the last 12 
month in 
2008 
conditional 
on being 
sexually 
active 
Reinterviewed 
in 2008 
Found by 
team of 
nurses 
conducting 
HIV test in 
2006 
Learned 
HIV status 
in 2006 
conditional 
on being 
found 
2006 pre-
test 
probability 
of being 
currently 
infected 
with HIV 
𝑃𝑢 0.084**  
 
   
 
[0.040]    
 
   
𝑃𝑐  -0.053 
 
   
 
[0.069]    
 
   
Female -0.135*** 0.022 0.010 0.010 0.091***  
 
[0.022]    [0.018] [0.015] [0.013] [0.032]    
Had no partner in the last 12 months in 
2006 
  
   
Had 1 partner  in the last 12 months in 
2006 0.028 0.024 0.000 0.033 0.007 
 
[0.034]    [0.029] [0.023] [0.021] [0.050]    
Had multiple partners  in the last 12 
months in 2006 0.153*** -0.004 -0.049 0.049* 0.176***  
 
[0.039]    [0.040] [0.031] [0.028] [0.062]    
Less than 29 years old  
     30-39 0.021 0.045* 0.099*** 0.004 0.040 
 
[0.019]    [0.024] [0.019] [0.016] [0.031]    
40-49 0.009 0.052* 0.087*** 0.011 -0.004 
 
[0.020]    [0.027] [0.021] [0.019] [0.040]    
50+ -0.007 0.055* 0.084*** -0.006 -0.028 
 
[0.020]    [0.028] [0.021] [0.019] [0.045]    
No school in 2008 
 
 
  
 Primary school 0.017 -0.032 -0.014 0.011 -0.043 
 
[0.019]    [0.025] [0.019] [0.016] [0.031]    
Secondary school or more 0.037 -0.063* -0.016 -0.027 0.007 
 
[0.028]    [0.036] [0.029] [0.025] [0.053]    
Married  -0.090*** 0.058** -0.053*** -0.039** 0.026 
 
[0.024]    [0.026] [0.020] [0.020] [0.038]    
Catholic 
     Muslim 0.033 -0.005 0.002 -0.013 -0.053 
 
[0.024]    [0.037] [0.024] [0.023] [0.040]    
Indigenous Christian /African Independent 
Churches 0.026 0.000 -0.011 0.018 0.001 
 
[0.026]    [0.033] [0.024] [0.023] [0.049]    
Other Christian -0.051**  0.006 0.022 0.006 -0.042 
 
[0.020]    [0.026] [0.020] [0.017] [0.040]    
Other or missing or no religions -0.023 0.032 -0.017 0.075** -0.081 
 
[0.030]    [0.042] [0.032] [0.037] [0.062]    
Own 2 acres or less of land 
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Continuation of Table A6      
Between 2 and 4 acres 0.020 0.032 -0.017 -0.005 -0.012 
 
[0.016]    [0.021] [0.016] [0.015] [0.030]    
More than 4 acres 0.009 0.024 -0.033* -0.022 -0.025 
 
[0.017]    [0.024] [0.018] [0.016] [0.035]    
2008 interview attempted in May 
     June 
 
-0.032 
 
 
 
  
[0.032] 
  
 July 
 
-0.090* 
  
 
  
[0.046] 
  
 August 
 
-0.189*** 
  
 
  
[0.056] 
  
 2006 pre-test probability of being currently 
infected with HIV 
 
-0.063 0.150*** -0.068                  
  
[0.070] [0.052] [0.047]                  
First attempted visit of the 2006 team of 
nurses is within one week of the first 
attempted visit of the survey team 
  
0.065*** 
  
   
[0.020] 
  Receive positive financial incentive in 
2004 testing experiment 
   
0.033* 0.083**  
    
[0.018] [0.042]    
Did not participate in 2004 testing 
experiment 
   
-0.054*** 0.021 
    
[0.018] [0.046]    
Probability that someone healthy of 
respondent's gender become infected with 
HIV in the next 12 months  with normal 
sexual behavior 
    
0.129*   
     
[0.067]    
N 2569 
  sig_4 0.271*** [0.020] 
r_12 0.026 [0.092] 
r_13 -0.007 [0.099] 
r_14 -0.026 [0.126] 
r_15 0.327 [0.402] 
r_23 -0.525* [0.227] 
r_24 -0.413** [0.120] 
r_25 0.299*** [0.045] 
r_34 
 
0.227*  [0.113] 
 r_35 
 
-0.030 [0.061] 
 r_45 
 
-0.096 [0.111] 
 Table shows marginal effects. In column 5, we report the coefficients, i.e. the marginal effect for𝑓𝑖
0∗. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
regressions include regions dummies and a missing indicator for age, education and land ownership. 
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Table A7: Potential endogeneity of transmission and survival expectations (Average marginal 
effects) 
  
Had 
multiple 
partners in 
the last 12 
month in 
2008 
conditional 
on being 
sexually 
active 
Found by 
team of 
nurses 
conducting 
HIV test in 
2006 
Learned 
HIV status 
in 2006 
conditional 
on being 
found 
2006 pre-
test 
probabilit
y of being 
currently 
infected 
with HIV 
Probability 
of survival 
in the next 
10 years 
conditional 
on being 
infected 
with HIV 
Difference 
in transm. 
risk 
associated 
with 
multiple 
versus one 
partner 
 
    
  𝑃𝑢 0.115**     
  
 
[0.048]    
   
  𝑃𝑐  0.170    
  
 
[0.188]    
   
  
2006 pre-test probability of being 
currently infected with HIV  0.178* -0.003  
  
 
 
[0.106] [0.054] 
 
  Own visit gap less than 1 week 
 
0.063*** 
   
0.045*   
 
 
[0.019] 
   
[0.024]    
Spouse visit gap less than 1 week 
  
 
 
 
0.026 
 
  
 
 
 
[0.032]  
Interaction of own and spouse visit 
gap    
 
 
 
-0.055 
 
  
 
 
 
[0.048] 
Receive positive financial incentive  
in 2004 testing experiment   0.031* 0.051 
  
 
  
[0.018] [0.054] 
  Did not participate in 2004 testing 
experiment   
    
 
  
    
Probability that someone healthy of 
respondent's gender become  
infected with HIV in the next 12 
months with normal sexual behavior 
   
0.288***  
  
 
   
[0.092]    
  Child mortality expectations  
(from 0 to 10 beans) 
    
-0.009*** 
 
     
[0.002]  
 r_12 -0.005 [0.084] 
r_13 -0.003 [0.099] 
r_14 0.018 [0.115] 
r_16 0.204 [0.128] 
r_17 -0.040 [0.085] 
Total number of observations used 2,592 
Robust standard errors clustered at the couple level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include same controls as in Table 5. Visit gap is difference between the first 
attempted visit of the 2006 team of nurses and the first attempted visit of the survey team.   
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Appendix B: Mortality and Infection Expectations Questions (Woman questionnaire) 
 
 
I will ask you several questions about the chance or likelihood that certain events are going to happen.  There are 10 
beans in the cup. I would like you to choose some beans out of these 10 beans and put them in the plate to express 
what you think the likelihood or chance is of a specific event happening. One bean represents one chance out of 10.  
If you do not put any beans in the plate, it means you are sure that the event will NOT happen. As you add beans, it 
means that you think the likelihood that the event happens increases. For example, if you put one or two beans, it 
means you think the event is not likely to happen but it is still possible.  If you pick 5 beans, it means that it is just as 
likely it happens as it does not happen (fifty-fifty). If you pick 6 beans, it means the event is slightly more likely to 
happen than not to happen. If you put 10 beans in the plate, it means you are sure the event will happen. There is not 
right or wrong answer, I just want to know what you think. 
Let me give you an example. Imagine that we are playing Bawo. Say, when asked about the chance that you will win, 
you put 7 beans in the plate. This means that you believe you would win 7 out of 10 games on average if we play for 
a long time. 
 
X2 Pick the number of beans that reflects how likely you think it is that… 
 
a) you are infected with HIV/AIDS now 
FOR MARRIED RESPONDENTS (INTERVIEWER: If respondent is not married  X2f) 
b) your spouse is infected with HIV/AIDS now 
FOR UNMARRIED RESPONDENTS 
c) your romantic partner is infected with HIV/AIDS now 
    
(INTERVIEWER: If no romantic partner, write 99 and  X2h) 
FOR BOTH MARRIED AND UNMARRIED RESPONDENTS 
X3 Consider a healthy woman in your village who currently does not have HIV. Pick the number of beans that reflects how 
likely you think it is that she will become infected with HIV … 
a) during a single intercourse without a condom with someone who has HIV/AIDS 
b) within the next 12 months (with normal sexual behavior) 
c) within the next 12 months if she is married to someone who is infected with HIV/AIDS 
d) within the next 12 months if she has several sexual partners in addition to her spouse 
e) What about if this woman we just spoke about [in X3d] uses a condom with all extra-marital partners? How many beans 
would you leave on the plate? 
Next, I would like you to consider the likelihood that somebody dies as time goes by. This is an imaginary person, and 
I am going to describe her to you. The beans in the plate represent the chances out of 10 that the person dies within 
a certain time period. The person is alive today so we start with an empty plate. As time goes by, more unfortunate 
things can happen and the person has more chances of dying, so more beans will be added to the plate” 
INTERVIEWER:  
1. Ask questions X4 to X5b for the INDIVIDUAL described in Column A. After X4 and X5a, LEAVE beans in 
plate. After X5b, put beans back in the cup. RECORD the number of beans in the plate after each question. 
2. COLUMN by COLUMN, REPEAT questions X4 to X5b for the INDIVIDUALS described in Columns B, C and 
D. For each individual, LEAVE the beans in the plate after X4 and X5a, and put beans back in the cup after 
X5b. RECORD the number of beans in the plate after each question. 
3. If respondent says “I Don’t Know”, probe with examples: “someone might die because of old age, disease, 
car accident. How likely do you think it is any of those things happen within [for X4: 1 year; for X5a: 5 years; 
for X5b: 10 years]? 
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 RECORD the number of beans in the plate for each 
question. 
DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL 
A B 
A woman your age who is 
healthy and does not have 
HIV 
A woman your age who is 
infected with HIV 
X4 Pick the number of beans that reflects how likely you 
think it is that [INDIVIDUAL] will die within a one-year 
period beginning today. 
(LEAVE BEANS ON PLATE) 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
If 10,  X4 for individual B 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
If 10, X4 for individual C 
X5 Add additional beans so that the number of beans in 
the plate reflects how likely you think it is that 
[INDIVIDUAL]   
a) will die within a five-year period beginning today 
 
 
 (LEAVE BEANS ON PLATE; IT IS POSSIBLE TO 
ADD ZERO ADDITIONAL BEANS) 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
If 10,  X4 for individual B 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
If 10, X4 for individual C 
b) will die within a ten-year period beginning today. 
 
 
(IT IS POSSIBLE TO ADD ZERO ADDITIONAL 
BEANS. PUT BEANS BACK IN CUP AFTER 
RECORDING THE ANSWER) 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
 X4 for individual B 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
 X4 for individual C 
 C  
A woman your age who is 
sick with AIDS and is treated 
with ARV 
 
If R does not know about 
ARV, skip and go to X6 
 
 
X4       Pick the number of beans that reflects how likely you 
think it is that [INDIVIDUAL] will die within a one-year 
period beginning today. 
(LEAVE BEANS ON PLATE) 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
If 10,  X4 for individual D 
 
X5 Add additional beans so that the number of beans in 
the plate reflects how likely you think it is that 
[INDIVIDUAL] 
  
a) will die within a five-year period beginning today. 
  
 (LEAVE BEANS ON PLATE; IT IS POSSIBLE TO 
ADD ZERO ADDITIONAL BEANS) 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
If 10,  X4 for individual D 
 
b) will die within a ten-year period beginning today. 
 
 
(IT IS POSSIBLE TO ADD ZERO ADDITIONAL 
BEANS. PUT BEANS BACK IN CUP AFTER 
RECORDING THE ANSWER) 
[_____] Beans  
in plate 
 X4 for individual D 
 
 
 
